University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law

DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law
Faculty Scholarship

Francis King Carey School of Law Faculty

2014

Energy Versus Property
Michael Pappas
University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law, mpappas@law.umaryland.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/fac_pubs
Part of the Energy and Utilities Law Commons, and the Environmental Law Commons

Digital Commons Citation
41 Florida State University Law Review 435 (2014).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Francis King Carey School of Law Faculty at
DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized
administrator of DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. For more information, please contact
smccarty@law.umaryland.edu.

ENERGY VERSUS PROPERTY
MICHAEL PAPPAS *
ABSTRACT
This Article is the first to detail the balance legislatures and courts have struck between
private property rights and the compelling public interest in energy production. By examining how property rights have consistently yielded to energy development from colonial times
to the most recent decisions involving hydraulic fracturing (“fracking”), it identifies a coherent energy/property balance that has shaped property expectations to accommodate energy
needs. The Article then applies this insight to current disputes pitting aggressive renewable
energy policies—such as nuisance immunity or mandatory installations on private property—against fundamental property expectations: the right to exclude and the right to use and
enjoy. In doing so, it analyzes how the energy/property balance informs reasonable property
expectations and helps resolve Fifth Amendment takings claims. The central conclusion is
this: throughout our legal history and into our energy future, when circumstances pit private property rights against the societal need for energy, i.e., when it comes to energy versus
property, energy tends to win.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Energy is a big deal right now. Whether the concern is fostering
domestic energy security, developing energy resources sustainably
and economically, or adjusting the energy portfolio in response to
climate change, the United States is searching for the proper policies
to shape its energy future.
As a result, renewable energy is a big deal right now. With the potential to address all of the concerns listed above, renewable energy
development has become a favored policy at all levels of government.
In fact, some state and municipal governments have begun aggressively promoting renewable energy projects even at the residential
level. With such policies hitting close to home, questions arise about
how far governments may go in encouraging or even mandating the
installation of renewable energy technologies on private property.
After all, property is also a big deal.
Part of the answer is that both energy and property have been a
big deal for a long while, and this is not the first time they have come
into tension. Even in the days when firewood was our principal energy source, the pressing social need for energy production fell into conflict with private property expectations. Though these energy-versusproperty disputes have arisen across multiple centuries and in a variety of resource contexts, the results maintain a surprising coherence. In striking the energy/property balance, legislatures and courts
have consistently shaped private property expectations to accommodate energy development. Thus when it comes down to energy versus
property, energy tends to win.
This Article is the first to trace and synthesize this energy/property
balance comprehensively, analyzing how property rights have yielded
to energy development in instances spanning from firewood gathering in colonial times to the most recent decisions involving hydraulic
fracturing (“fracking”). The Article also examines how this legal tradition applies to current policies promoting and mandating renewable energy installation, offering guidance to both policymakers and
courts in applying the energy/property balance to an emerging set
of conflicts.
Part II begins by offering the context for current and emerging
disputes between energy development and property rights, particularly regarding residential and small-scale renewable energy projects. First, it offers a background overview of the value of small-scale
renewable energy and the barriers that inhibit its development. It
then describes aggressive government policies and scholarly proposals for overcoming these barriers by, for example, mandating renewable energy installations on private property or limiting neighbors’ rights to interfere with these projects. Part III examines how
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these aggressive policies create tension with core private property
rights. It begins by summarizing basic private property expectations,
such as the right to exclude and the right to use and enjoy, as well as
the expected property-rule and liability-rule remedies that protect
these rights. Next, it discusses how aggressive renewable energy policies alter expectations regarding property rights and remedies, leading to legal conflicts in the form of takings claims. In turn, Part IV
contextualizes these conflicts, describing how our legal tradition has
consistently imposed an energy/property balance that shapes property expectations to accommodate energy development. In doing so, it
reviews precedent spanning from early energy sources such as firewood and water, to emerging electrical production from coal, water,
and utilities, to oil and gas production, and even to farm production.
Part V then applies this energy/property balance to aggressive renewable energy policies. It begins by analyzing how the energy/
property balance shapes reasonable property expectations. Then, it
offers normative reasons for applying the energy/property balance to
renewable energy development. Finally, it examines how the energy/
property balance influences the takings inquiry for aggressive renewable energy policies, concluding that none of these policies create
compensable takings. Lastly, Part VI offers overall conclusions.
II. RENEWABLE ENERGY
Renewable energy occupies a central role in the planning of our
energy future. This Part outlines the values of small-scale, distributed renewable energy measures from environmental, social, and economic perspectives. It then discusses the market failures and legal
disputes that have handicapped the advance of renewables and that
justify government intervention to promote renewable energy programs. Finally, it offers an overview of aggressive policy measures
and scholarly suggestions to promote renewable energy development.
A. The Value of Renewable Energy
“At a point in the future that is no longer unimaginably remote,
renewable energy will be necessary to human survival.” 1 Even today,
the majority of Americans favor renewable energy, 2 and this broad
1. Garrick B. Pursley & Hannah J. Wiseman, Local Energy, 60 EMORY L.J. 877, 891
(2011).
2. See, e.g., PIKE RESEARCH, ENERGY & ENVIRONMENT CONSUMER SURVEY 5, 50
(2012) (surveying more than one thousand adults and finding that over 75 percent of respondents favored wind and solar energy, although only 47 percent supported biofuels,
another touted form of renewable energy); Jeffrey M. Jones, In U.S., Alternative Energy
Bill Does Best Among Eight Proposals, GALLUP (Feb. 2, 2011), http://www.gallup.com/poll/
145880/Alternative-Energy-Bill-Best-Among-Eight-Proposals.aspx (surveying more than
one thousand adults and finding that 83 percent of respondents would support congressional legislation that provides incentives for the use of solar and other renewable energy
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support is not surprising given the environmental and national security benefits of renewables. A shift to clean energy will not only reduce greenhouse gas emissions 3 that contribute to the enormous and
exigent problem of climate change, 4 but it will also represent a major
step toward achieving sustainability 5 and domestic energy security. 6
Moreover, with electricity demand expected to double by 2050 7 and
with the United States at only 10 percent of its potential renewable
capacity, 8 renewable energy expansion must be part of the nation’s
energy agenda.
The challenge, then, is in how to increase renewable energy production. One tactic is to rely on large, utility-scale renewables operations, such as major solar-power or wind-power installations. Such
grand projects, with their attendant challenges of siting, transmission, and environmental tradeoffs, have received a great deal of popular and scholarly attention, 9 and they will certainly be a part of
our energy future. However, smaller scale distributed generation
sources also have a role to play. Though they have received less attention than utility-scale facilities, distributed generation projects
“are just as essential as large-scale installations to establishing a
stable nationwide energy infrastructure powered substantially by
renewable resources.” 10
sources); Humphrey Taylor, Large Majorities in U.S. and Five Largest European Countries
Favor More Wind Farms and Subsidies for Bio-fuels, but Opinion Is Split on Nuclear
Power, HARRIS INTERACTIVE (Oct. 13, 2010), http://www.harrisinteractive.com/News
Room/HarrisPolls/FinancialTimesHarrisPolls/tabid/449/ctl/ReadCustom%20Default/mid/15
12/ArticleId/584/Default.aspx (surveying more than one thousand adults in a Financial
Times/ Harris poll and finding that 87 percent of respondents favored an increase in the
number of wind farms).
3. See, e.g., Uma Outka, The Renewable Energy Footprint, 30 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 241,
253 (2011).
4. See Outka, supra note 3, at 253 (suggesting that despite competing concerns, climate change concerns should be the primary driver behind setting energy policy); Pursley
& Wiseman, supra note 1, at 890 (noting climate change impacts including “rising seas,
more severe storms, and longer droughts to higher extinction rates for animal and plant
species”); Karin P. Sheldon, Upstream of Peril: The Role of Federal Lands in Addressing the
Extinction Crisis, 24 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 2 (2007) (“[Climate change] includes and eclipses all other environmental issues we face in the twenty-first century . . . .”).
5. Hannah Wiseman et al., Formulating a Law of Sustainable Energy: The Renewables Component, 28 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 827, 836-39 (2011).
6. See Pursley & Wiseman, supra note 1, at 890.
7. Sara C. Bronin, Curbing Energy Sprawl with Microgrids, 43 CONN. L. REV. 547,
549 (2010).
8. Outka, supra note 3, at 247.
9. See, e.g., Bronin, supra note 7; Ronald H. Rosenberg, Making Renewable Energy a
Reality—Finding Ways to Site Wind Power Facilities, 32 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y
REV. 635 (2008) (focusing on wind development).
10. Pursley & Wiseman, supra note 1, at 880; see also GARY D. ALLISON & JOHN L.
WILLIAMS, THE EFFECTS OF STATE LAWS AND REGULATIONS ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF
RENEWABLE SOURCES OF ELECTRIC ENERGY 4 (2010), available at http://www.rff.org/RFF/
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Distributed generation sources are on-site electrical generation
facilities linked closely with their ultimate uses. 11 Examples can
range from “[s]mall-scale renewables on rooftops, parking garages,
factories, and in yards” 12 to “[b]uilding-related renewable energy,”
such as “solar, wind, geothermal, and fuel cell technologies
. . . incorporated into inhabited structures and used by those
structures’ occupants.” 13
Among the advantages of distributed generation are the quick
startup times that can “quickly reduce America’s dependence on fossil fuels.” 14 While utility-scale projects may take years to come online,
“[a] homeowner or business in an area with adequate enabling regulations for small-scale renewable electricity generation can have a
system up and running in several months.” 15 Government entities,
particularly at the state or local level, have looked to distributed generation as “an immediate and substantial step toward increasing renewable energy capacity.” 16
Additionally, distributed generation achieves efficiency by eliminating transmission costs and losses. With distributed generation,
energy production is decentralized and proximate to its end uses. 17
This “maximizes efficiency, because little energy is lost during
transmission. Thus nearly all of the energy produced by the generator can be directly used by the end user.” 18 Reducing these transmission losses represents a major energy savings. Since roughly 10 percent of our energy is lost in transmission to buildings 19 and since
“buildings consume 40 [percent] of our energy, use two-thirds of our
electricity, and emit 40 [percent] of our greenhouse gases,” 20 the advantages of minimizing transmission are far from negligible. In the
same vein, distributed generation reduces the need for transmission
infrastructure, 21 which saves further costs and leaves a smaller
geographic footprint than do larger energy installations. By increasDocuments/RFF-BCK-AllisonandWilliams-StateLaws.pdf; MAXIMILLIAN AUFFHAMMER &
ALAN H. SANSTAD, ENERGY EFFICIENCY IN THE RESIDENTIAL AND COMMERCIAL SECTORS 2
(2011), available at http://www.rff.org/RFF/Documents/RFF-BCK-AuffhammerSandstadEEResComm.pdf.
11. Outka, supra note 3, at 256.
12. Pursley & Wiseman, supra note 1, at 899.
13. Sara C. Bronin, Building-Related Renewable Energy and the Case of 360 State
Street, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1875, 1881 (2012).
14. Pursley & Wiseman, supra note 1, at 899.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Bronin, supra note 7, at 559.
18. Bronin, supra note 13, at 1891.
19. Bronin, supra note 7, at 556.
20. Bronin, supra note 13, at 1884.
21. See Pursley & Wiseman, supra note 1, at 897.
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ing renewable energy production in already developed areas, distributed generation avoids both the “energy sprawl” and negative ecosystem and species impacts associated with geographically expanding
energy development. 22
Another advantage of distributed generation sources is that they
can combine to form a “microgrid” system of neighborhood-scale energy grids, localizing and sharing energy production. “Microgrids organize distributed generation technology into a closed, low-voltage
system that may address the needs of multiple users using multiple
kinds of technologies.” 23 For example, a microgrid might allow an entire block of homeowners to share and store the power generated by
an array of solar cells. 24 Microgrids therefore allow for additional renewable energy capacity and distribution while still reducing demands on both the grid and transmission infrastructure. 25
Further, these microgrids are valuable in that “[t]hey allow property owners to achieve economies of scale by spreading the costs and
the risk of installation and maintenance among many parties.” 26
Even though distributed generation installation may have negative
costs (i.e., more than pay for itself), 27 the upfront cost may be difficult
for individuals to bear or may be difficult to finance on individual
levels. 28 Microgrids, however, can allow for easier financing, risk
spreading, and cooperation. 29 For example, a group of neighbors
might coordinate to install a wind turbine on a vacant lot or invest in
a solar panel to share the cost and the output. 30 This coordination
also allows groups of neighbors collectively to locate renewable energy generating stations in the most advantageous location.
Finally, microgrid users can also incorporate multiple sources of
power generation, such as wind and solar, to smooth out supply, and
because microgrid users may require power at different times of day,
the shared enterprise can help spread demand. 31 Microgrids’ decentralization may even offer greater power reliability because if
one power source goes down, other power sources can remain fully

22. See Outka, supra note 3, at 243.
23. Bronin, supra note 7, at 559.
24. Id.
25. See id. at 561-62; Outka, supra note 3, at 303.
26. Bronin, supra note 7, at 547.
27. ALAN J. KRUPNICK ET AL., TOWARD A NEW NATIONAL ENERGY POLICY: ASSESSING
THE OPTIONS – EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 9 (2010), available at http://www.rff.org/RFF/
Documents/RFF_NEPI_Exec_Summary.pdf.
28. Bronin, supra note 7, at 563.
29. Id.
30. See id. at 551; Bronin, supra note 13, at 1882.
31. Bronin, supra note 7, at 563.
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functional, making energy infrastructure more secure from disaster
or attack. 32
Among the distributed renewable options, solar and wind energy
are primary candidates because they represent two of the four key
resources for land-based renewable energy, 33 are available at a distributed level, 34 have smaller land footprints than other energy alternatives, 35 and require less water than do other energy sources. 36
Moreover, unlike hydropower, solar and wind energy do not require
proximity to rivers or construction of dams, which come with their
own economic and environmental costs. As a result, distributed generation of wind and solar technologies is particularly attractive at the
state and local level, and this Article focuses primarily on these forms
of renewable energy development.
B. Renewable Energy Challenges
Despite the benefits of such clean energy sources, challenges remain in implementing these projects. First, market irrationality or
distortion often prevents private investment in distributed renewables and energy efficiency measures. Second, disputes or lack of cooperation with neighboring property owners increases costs, creates
delays, and sometimes forecloses altogether the installation of
distributed renewables.
While market forces have led to some progress in clean energy
installation, 37 market interventions—either through government
incentives or mandates—have spurred much of the clean energy development. 38 Such intervention has been necessary due to what has
been termed “the energy paradox” 39 or the “energy efficiency gap” 40
(collectively “the paradox”). The paradox is as follows: though
“[m]any studies have shown that investing today in energy efficient
[and renewable energy] technologies will return fuel savings that
significantly outweigh the initial investment cost over the lifetime
of the purchase[s,] . . . businesses and consumers often reject
such investments.” 41
32. Id.
33. Outka, supra note 3, at 247.
34. See Bronin, supra note 13, at 1877.
35. Outka, supra note 3, at 249.
36. See id. at 253.
37. See id. at 247.
38. Id.
39. KRUPNICK ET AL., supra note 27, at 9.
40. See, e.g., Brandon Hofmeister, Bridging the Gap: Using Social Psychology to Design Market Interventions to Overcome the Energy Efficiency Gap in Residential Energy
Markets, 19 SOUTHEASTERN ENVTL. L.J. 1, 4 (2010).
41. KRUPNICK ET AL., supra note 27, at 9.
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A number of market irrationalities or distortions can account for
the paradox. First, consumers frequently misjudge or discount the
benefit of renewable energy investments, often demanding “payback
periods of perhaps 4 years or less on investments with lifetimes of 15
to 50 years, implying required rates of return that are well above
market rates.” 42 Additionally, an array of cognitive barriers can also
prevent rational investment in energy efficiency or renewable energy. 43 For example, the endowment effect and failure to ignore sunk
costs leads people to rely on previous investments rather than reinvesting in new, more efficient technologies, even when a pure costbenefit analysis suggests such reinvestment. 44 Second, a status quo
bias influences people to rely on default positions, such as dated construction practices or non-renewable energy sources, rather than
reevaluating investment in renewables or energy efficiency. 45 Third,
people tend to undervalue costs and benefits that are not “vivid” or
“emotional,” and many basic efficiency or energy-supply choices do
not register as vivid. 46 Fourth, many irrationally perceive environmentally friendly products as either poorer performing or bearing a
cost premium. 47 Fifth, in our mobile society, people may believe they
will sell properties or move before they see a payoff for a renewable
energy investment. 48 Finally, split incentives may exist for property
owners; for example, landlords often have no incentive to invest in
energy efficiency or renewable energy because the tenant pays the
utility bill. 49 The net result of these phenomena singularly or in combination is that the market becomes distorted against distributed
generation of renewable energy, hampering its expansion.

42. Id. Economists disagree as to whether this energy paradox is caused by hidden
costs (for example, if new technologies are unreliable or inferior), or market failures (such
as imperfect information about the benefits of new technologies, split incentives of those
renting versus owning property, or lack of capital and other financing problems) that would
require affirmative policies to correct. See id. For an in depth discussion of the theories,
particularly market failure scenarios, underlying the energy paradox, see AUFFHAMMER &
SANSTAD, supra note 10, at 20-29; Hofmeister, supra note 40, at 14-18.
Many advocates of standards to mandate or promote energy-efficiency technologies believe that market failure alone explains the energy paradox, but studies can measure the costs and benefits of energy-efficiency policies with differing assumptions for complete, partial, and no market failures. See KRUPNICK ET AL., supra note 27, at 8-10, 13-14.
43. See Hofmeister, supra note 40, at 18-31.
44. Id. at 21.
45. Id. at 22.
46. See id. at 28-29.
47. Id. at 30.
48. See Pursley & Wiseman, supra note 1, at 903-04.
49. See, e.g., Lucas Davis & David I. Levine, Renting Inefficiency, ENERGY ECONOMICS
EXCH. (Nov. 26, 2012), http://energyathaas.wordpress.com/2012/11/26/renting-inefficiency;
see also Matthew L. Wald, Why Renters Use More Electricity, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 20, 2012,
2:27 PM), http://green.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/12/20/why-renters-use-more-electricity.

2014]

ENERGY VERSUS PROPERTY

443

In addition to these market irrationalities, a lack of cooperation
between neighboring property owners has also inhibited distributed
generation and microgrid development. 50 For example, even though
shared distributed generation and microgrid projects can drive costs
down and increase reliability for neighbors, few of these projects
exist 51 because development of these projects requires coordination
and shared infrastructure such as piping, distribution lines, and
monitoring equipment. 52
Beyond failing to cooperate, neighbors may also be outright hostile
to renewable energy development. As Troy Rule has put it, “The
greatest opponents of renewable energy development are often those
living next door.” 53 This has certainly been the case for proposed wind
installations, which have been the frequent target of nuisance suits
from neighbors whose complaints have ranged from aesthetic impacts
and light reflection, to noise and vibrations, to the risks of ice being
thrown from the blades. 54 Moreover, opposition by neighbors is a particularly acute impediment to distributed generation and microgrids,
which may bring renewables projects closer to objecting homes, businesses, and populated areas. 55 For example, neighbors “may reject
microgrid technologies, taking a ‘not-in-my-backyard’ approach that
drives distributed generation projects outward,” 56 or they may “object
to restrictions placed on their activities when a renewable energy
project is sited nearby.” 57 Altogether, these issues of market distortion and lack of cooperation among property owners impede distributed generation and microgrid development.
C. Aggressive Efforts to Promote Renewable Energy
To overcome these barriers, both government entities and scholars
have called for aggressive efforts to promote distributed renewable
energy installation through both mandates and limitations on neighbors’ ability to interfere with renewable energy projects.

50. See Bronin, supra note 13, at 1878; Bronin, supra note 7, at 568, 570-72.
51. Bronin, supra note 7, at 565.
52. Id. at 583.
53. Troy A. Rule, Renewable Energy and the Neighbors, 2010 UTAH L. REV. 1223,
1223.
54. See Renner Kincaid Walker, The Answer, My Friend, Is Blowin’ in the Wind: Nuisance Suits and the Perplexing Future of American Wind Farms, 16 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L.
509, 520-21 (2011); Brett Slensky & Angela Pappas, Wind Power Projects, Nuisance
Claims, and Right-to-Farm, ABA AGRIC. MGMT. COMM. NEWSL., Nov. 2010, at 9, 9-11
(summarizing common complaints against wind installations).
55. See Bronin, supra note 13, at 1892; see also Bronin, supra note 7, at 571-72.
56. Bronin, supra note 7, at 579.
57. Bronin, supra note 13, at 1893.
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1. Renewable Energy Mandates
Most policies to encourage renewables either rely on market incentives, such as tax rebates, or utility-driven initiatives, 58 like renewable portfolio standards (“RPS”) 59 or net metering. 60 While these
have certainly helped promote renewable energy, they have not effectively spurred distributed generation. 61 In response, some government entities have turned to mandates for distributed renewable energy. 62 After all, “[i]t is much easier to be efficient when the user has
no choice.” 63
As a modest example of such mandates, all states have developed
some kind of energy efficiency building code. 64 Moreover, several municipal governments, including Boston, have imposed mandatory
green building standards on the private sector, 65 similar to the approach taken by some members of the European Union. 66 Taking
these mandates a step further, New Jersey requires that a developer
of a new home offer to install or have someone else install solar energy for the prospective owner. 67
California has been even more aggressive. The California Energy
Commission recently approved standards for new homes and commercial buildings set to take effect on July 1, 2014. 68 These standards
require, among other measures, that both residential and commercial
58. See ALLISON & WILLIAMS, supra note 10, at 4.
59. RPS mandate that a certain percentage or amount of electrical energy come from
renewable sources, but these impact utilities most directly. Id.
60. With net metering, a customer-generator can sell electricity back to the grid while
still relying on the grid when their renewable source is not performing. Id.
61. See id.; see also Melissa Powers, The Cost of Coal: Climate Change and the End of
Coal as a Source of “Cheap” Electricity, 12 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 407, 434 (2010).
62. Substantial government market intervention, including mandates, has been used
to promote development of other energy resources. See, e.g., 1 BRUCE M. KRAMER &
PATRICK R. MARTIN, THE LAW OF POOLING AND UNITIZATION § 1.02 (3d ed. 1989) (“The history of oil and gas development in the United States leads to the inevitable conclusion that
the legal, economic, and engineering worlds have never reached a level of coordination that
would allow for the efficient and equitable development of oil and gas reservoirs without
substantial governmental intervention.”).
63. Bronin, supra note 13, at 1888.
64. ALLISON & WILLIAMS, supra note 10, at 154.
65. See Carl J. Circo, Using Mandates and Incentives to Promote Sustainable Construction and Green Building Projects in the Private Sector: A Call for More State Land Use
Policy Initiatives, 112 PENN. ST. L. REV. 731, 758-59 (2008).
66. See Nancy J. King & Brian J. King, Creating Incentives for Sustainable Buildings:
A Comparative Law Approach Featuring the United States and the European Union, 23 VA.
ENVTL. L.J. 397, 449 (2005).
67. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27D-141.4(a) (West 2013); Pursley & Wiseman, supra note 1,
at 911-12.
68. Revised Effective Date for the 2013 California Building Energy Efficiency Standards, CAL. ENERGY COMM’N (Dec. 11, 2013), http://www.energy.ca.gov/title24/
2013standards/2013_standards_revised_effective_date.html.
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roofs include “solar-ready” rooftops to allow for the future addition of
photovoltaic panels. 69 While the standards merely require that roofs
“make[] space available” for “easier installation” of solar cells “at a
future date” 70 and do not command the immediate installation of
solar cells, 71 they still impose affirmative mandates to support distributed generation. 72 The code also requires that electrical service
panels have a reserved space for breakers serving “future solar
electric installation[s].” 73
Some U.S. jurisdictions have imposed even further reaching policies by mandating installation of certain renewable and energy efficient technologies. This is the approach taken in Puerto Rico, 74 which
requires installation of solar hot water heaters. Similarly, the California Energy Commission has adopted the “Zero Net Energy” goal
that by 2020 all new homes and by 2030 all commercial buildings
“must use a combination of improved efficiency and distributed renewable generation to meet 100 percent of their annual energy
need.” 75 To meet this goal, further mandates, such as rooftop photovoltaic cells, appear imminent.
In addition to these policies, scholars and commentators endorse
even more ambitious mandates to promote distributed renewables
and energy efficiency. 76 Some scholars justify such mandates as nec69. News Release, Cal. Energy Comm’n, Energy Commission Approves More Efficient
Buildings for California’s Future (May 31, 2012), available at http://www.energy.ca.gov/
releases/2012_releases/2012-05-31_energy_commission_approves_more_efficient_buildings
_nr.html.
70. CAL. ENERGY COMM’N, CALIFORNIA’S 2013 — RESIDENTIAL: BUILDING ENERGY
EFFICIENCY
STANDARDS
(2013),
available
at
http://www.energy.ca.gov/title24/
2013standards/rulemaking/documents/2013_Building_Energy_Efficiency_Standards_
infographics.pdf.
71. Dana Hull, California Poised to Require ‘Solar Ready Roofs’ on New Homes and
JOSE
MERCURY
NEWS
(May
30,
2012,
3:06
PM),
Buildings,
SAN
http://www.mercurynews.com/business/ci_20744057/california-poised-require-solar-readyroofs-new-homes.
72. CAL. ENERGY COMM’N, PROPOSED 2013 BUILDING ENERGY EFFICIENCY STANDARDS
74, 129, 132 (2012), available at http://www.energy.ca.gov/2012publications/CEC-400-2012004/CEC-400-2012-004-15DAY.pdf.
73. Id. at 131.
74. Puerto Rico – Building Energy Code with Mandatory Solar Water Heating, DSIRE,
http://www.dsireusa.org/incentives/incentive.cfm?Incentive_Code=PR03R&re=0&ee=1 (last
updated Feb. 21, 2013).
75. News Release, Cal. Energy Comm’n, supra note 69. Further, cities like San Jose
have set goals to “ ‘[r]eceive 100 percent of [its] electrical power from clean renewable
sources’ by 2025.” Pursley & Wiseman, supra note 1, at 897 (quoting CITY OF SAN JOSE,
2009-2010
CLEAN
TECH
LEGISLATIVE
AGENDA
2
(2009),
available
at
http://www.sanjoseca.gov/DocumentCenter/View/3701).
76. See, e.g., King & King, supra note 66, at 449 (2005) (“The lack of federal legislation
mandating or providing incentives for sustainable construction practices constitutes a significant impediment to the development of nationwide sustainable construction programs
in the United States.”); cf. Circo, supra note 65, at 764 (“Many studies expose the relative
merits of imposing regulations and other government mandates on markets versus using
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essary to overcome the market failures 77 and cognitive barriers 78 discussed above or to correct for externalities in building development. 79
Others assert that even if the market is functioning correctly, renewable energy mandates are appropriate because of the benefits of
bringing renewables into production 80 and because mandates are effective as a regulatory tool for achieving policy objectives costeffectively. 81 Additionally, such renewables mandates generate
“greater demand (to spur technological progress)” and “cost reductions that come from both experience and economies of scale.” 82
Finally, mandates for distributed generation, whether solar or
wind, would reduce the footprint of renewable energy, allowing for
greater generation without further environmental disturbance. 83 To
quote one commentator, “[G]overnment should no more recoil from
green building [and renewable energy] mandates than it does from
sanitary codes.” 84
Commentators have even suggested specific forms that the mandates may take. One thoughtful scholar has suggested that clean energy mandates are justified not only for new homes, 85 as California
has imposed, but also for existing buildings. 86 Further, a number of
incentives and other economic instruments to adjust market forces. Among other things,
we know that economic instruments carefully designed to work with market forces are
often effective, but we also know that direct regulation may be essential in the face of market failures or in light of institutional and historical factors.”); Pursley & Wiseman, supra
note 1, at 901 (“[M]unicipal governments must be free to enact all local land use regulations and standards, including building codes and zoning, necessary to encourage and ensure relatively predictable regulation of the installation of renewables.”); id. at 907 (“The
need to enable (or, in some cases, command) local governments to reshape land use laws to
accommodate distributed renewables . . . was well documented during the failed push toward renewables in the 1970s . . . .”).
77. Hofmeister, supra note 40, at 63 (“Closing the energy efficiency gap is important
enough to justify market interventions by the government.”).
78. See id. at 21, 66.
79. See Circo, supra note 65, at 744, 753, 762-63.
80. See ALLISON & WILLIAMS, supra note 10, at 156; see also Circo, supra note 65, at
732-33.
81. See Hofmeister, supra note 40, at 69.
82. KRUPNICK ET AL., supra note 27, at 18; see also Hofmeister, supra note 40, at 55.
83. Cf. Outka, supra note 3, at 302 (“Much like reusing land for a large-scale facility,
onsite energy generation minimizes the footprint with rooftop solar panels, small-scale
wind, and combined heat and power systems built into existing structures. . . . Yet ‘cities
and residences cover about 140 million acres of land’ in the U.S., according to DOE, and
considering land use only, solar panels could supply ‘every kilowatt-hour of our nation’s
current electricity requirements’ on just 7 percent of that area—‘on roofs, on parking lots,
along highway walls, on the sides of buildings, and in other dual use scenarios.’ ” (quoting
U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, PV FAQS: HOW MUCH LAND WILL PV NEED TO SUPPLY OUR
ELECTRICITY? (2004), available at http://www1.eere.energy.gov/solar/pdfs/35097.pdf)).
84. Circo, supra note 65, at 780.
85. Hofmeister, supra note 40, at 70.
86. Id. at 72-73.
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scholars have pointed out the need for policies to promote microgrid
development and siting, 87 and Sara Bronin has suggested that states
“should consider laws that provide special treatment for siting microgrid projects,” 88 including “requir[ing] localities to include microgrid
siting as a mandatory element of their comprehensive plans.” 89
Finally, some scholars and policy advisors have called for even
more ambitious measures to promote maximum renewable energy
productivity for immediate greenhouse gas reductions, 90 though concerns over takings challenges have constrained these policies. 91 For
example, to promote microgrids and overcome neighbors’ lack of coordination, scholarship suggests that states might need to impose
mandatory microgrid installation in certain small-scale energy districts. 92 Similarly, to derive maximum benefit from renewable energy
installations, a state might require installation of renewable energy
facilities on prime locations for wind and solar energy production. 93
Finally, to maximize expansion of distributed generation and tie it
into existing energy grids, a state might mandate that certain parcels
or buildings allow third parties, such as utilities, to install and operate renewable technologies on their rooftops. 94
87. See, e.g., Bronin, supra note 7, at 580-81 (surveying scholarship).
88. Id. at 579.
89. Id. at 580.
90. See, e.g., Div. on Earth & Life Studies, Nat’l Research Council, Expert Report:
Limiting the Magnitude of Climate Change, NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIS. (2010),
http://dels.nas.edu/Report/Limiting-Magnitude-Climate-Change/12785 (calling for immediate implementation of renewable energy to the maximum possible capacity); cf. Bronin,
supra note 13, at 1891 (“Over the next twenty-three years, three-fourths of our building
stock will be built new or renovated. In light of that opportunity, the ease with which property owners could either develop buildings with BRRE, or retrofit existing buildings with
BRRE, is a matter of pressing concern. If we get the legal framework correct now, it is
more likely that we will be able to count on more BRRE being developed in the future.”
(footnote omitted)); Alexandra B. Klass, The Frontier of Eminent Domain, 79 U. COLO. L.
REV. 651, 689 (2008) (“This is a critical time to be reflecting on property rights . . . . The
nation as a whole is struggling with energy needs, climate change, and a host of other concerns that rest in large part on how to best use and allocate property and resources.”).
91. E.g., Bronin, supra note 7, at 583; Troy Rule, A Downwind View of the Cathedral:
Using Rule Four to Allocate Wind Rights, 46 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 207, 242 (2009).
92. But cf. Bronin, supra note 7, at 583.
93. Cf. Rule, supra note 91, at 213 (“All else equal, public policy favors rules that allocate competing wind rights so as to maximize the amount of wind energy produced over the
long run from discrete quantities of property and capital investment. Properties with consistent average wind speeds and other characteristics ideal for wind energy production are
a scarce and highly valuable resource. Additionally, although wind is itself renewable, the
costs of relocating a wind turbine after initial installation can be quite substantial. . . .
[R]ules are needed to ensure efficient use of property that is situated near boundary lines
and is thus at risk of being underutilized.” (footnotes omitted)).
94. Powers, supra note 61, at 435-36 (“[I]n urban areas, instead of encouraging ratepayers to install privately owned photovoltaic cells on their roofs, utilities could perform
the installation and retain ownership of the solar array, while providing the ratepayer a
discounted electricity rate in exchange for allowing the utility to site the solar array on the
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2. Limits on Neighbors’ Rights
Along with mandates, some jurisdictions and commentators also
support efforts to promote renewable energy by limiting neighbors’
ability to challenge or interfere with renewables projects. For example, New Jersey 95 and, arguably, Vermont 96 have statutorily limited
nuisance suits against wind installations. Similarly, some state laws
“protect the right to install solar panels on one’s home.” 97 Commentators have called for expansion and widespread adoption of such nuisance-immunizing policies, 98 noting that “[t]he time may be approaching when the federal government may need not only to encourage the use of clean energy devices, but also to protect the right
to install, use, and maintain them.” 99
In addition to limiting nuisance suits, states have also created regimes that prevent neighbors from using their property in a manner
that might interfere with the productivity of installed renewables.
For example, both Wyoming and New Mexico have statutes that
protect installed solar energy cells from interference by imposing
an easement in the airspace above neighboring properties. 100 Again,
commentators have called for expansion of such policies, suggesting
that state-level lawmakers “eliminate both preexisting and future
deed restrictions that impinge on solar rights, restrict neighbors’
ability to obstruct existing solar collectors, prevent homeowners’
associations from limiting solar rights, and require localities
ratepayer’s roof. If the utility could recover expenses associated with the installation and
construction of the infrastructure necessary to implement the distributed generation system, it would have ample incentives to revolutionize the electricity system. Because the
technology to develop distributed generation already exists, utilities could undertake the
process almost immediately.” (footnote omitted)); Nathanial Gronewold, Industry’s N.J.
Boom Casts Shadow over Program that Spurred It, GREENWIRE (Aug. 25, 2011),
http://www.eenews.net/stories/1059953151 (Gronewald describes the utility-driven process
for solar development, where, as opposed to independently owned rooftop projects, a utility
company owns and operates a rooftop solar system located on another property owner’s
rooftop. In these instances, the property owner signs a purchase power agreement to buy
the electricity produced at a discounted rate. Though entry into such programs has been
voluntary, mandates may be necessary to increase such renewable capacity). These installations have been especially popular with “big-box” retail stores. See Sarah Korones, Bigbox Stores Lead the Pack in Solar Power Use, SMARTPLANET (Sept. 12, 2012, 1:35 AM),
http://www.smartplanet.com/blog/bulletin/big-box-stores-lead-the-pack-in-solar-power-use.
95. See Walker, supra note 54, at 525-26; Slensky & Pappas, supra note 54, at 9.
96. See Slensky & Pappas, supra note 54, at 11.
97. LaVonda N. Reed-Huff, Dirty Dishes, Dirty Laundry, and Windy Mills: A Framework for Regulation of Clean Energy Devices, 40 ENVTL. L. 859, 881 (2010).
98. See id. at 877; Joseph Haupt, Note, A Right to Wind? Promoting Wind Energy by
Limiting the Possibility of Nuisance Litigation, 3 GEO. WASH. J. ENERGY & ENVTL. L. 256
(2012).
99. Reed-Huff, supra note 97, at 911; see also Walker, supra note 54.
100. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 47-3-4(B)(1) (2013); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 34-22-103(b)(i) (2013);
see also Troy A. Rule, Property Rights and Modern Energy, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 803,
824 (2013).
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to protect solar rights through zoning ordinances.” 101 In the wind
context, similar policies would protect wind installations from
upwind interference. 102
Scholars have identified even further-reaching approaches to maximizing wind and solar energy production by not only preventing
neighbors from interfering with renewable energy installations but
also compelling neighbors to play a role in developing these resources. For example, Troy Rule has suggested that policies should
“encourage or facilitate agreements among neighboring landowners
to promote development of the most productive turbine sites, regardless of proximity to property lines.” 103 Such policies could encourage
the greatest output from renewable energy installations, but scholars
have again expressed reservations that takings concerns might limit
the implementation of such policies. 104
III. TENSION WITH PROPERTY EXPECTATIONS
As discussed above, by bringing energy production closer to its
places of use, distributed generation offers many benefits. However,
by moving energy production closer to homes, businesses, and populated areas, it also breeds potential conflicts with property expectations. To examine these conflicts, this Part first offers an overview of
core property rights expectations. Then it discusses property owners’
expectations for the remedies to protect these rights. Finally, it addresses how aggressive renewable energy policies create tension with
these expectations.
A. Property Rights Expectations:
The Right to Exclude and the Right to Use and Enjoy
Two key expectations lie at the core of the “bundle of rights” that
comprise property ownership: the right to exclude and the right to
use and enjoy.
In vernacular conceptions of property, the right to exclude is paramount. The “home as castle” metaphor remains common, and many
perceive the right to exclude as both straightforward and inviolate.
As one scholar has put it:
Real property law is often treated as a refuge for clear legal rights,
free from the need to balance competing interests. To take the
most basic example, I have a right to prevent my neighbor from
101. Sara C. Bronin, Response, Solar Rights for Texas Property Owners, 89 TEX. L.
REV. 79, 80 (2011) (paraphrasing Jamie E. France, Note, A Proposed Solar Access Law for
the State of Texas, 89 TEX. L. REV. 187, 188-89 (2010)).
102. See Rule, supra note 91, at 208-09.
103. Id. at 215 (emphasis added).
104. See id. at 242.

450

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41:435

trespassing or encroaching on my land, and my neighbor has a correlative duty not to trespass or encroach. 105

While the perception of an absolute right to exclude might not get
the law absolutely right, 106 right-to-exclude expectations maintain
substantial importance even in the highest and most theoretical legal
conceptions of property. For example, the Supreme Court has recognized the right to exclude as one of the most central and sacred of
property rights, 107 and most jurists and property theorists name the
right to exclude as a core, 108 if not essential and irreducible, 109 aspect
of property rights.
Also central to property expectations is the right to use and enjoy,
which functions both as a right and a limitation on property uses.
On the one hand, use and enjoyment is a concept of autonomy; a
property owner’s expectation includes the right to use and enjoy her
property as she wishes without disturbance. On the other hand, this
use and enjoyment concept limits a property owner’s autonomy because she may not make an unreasonable use that injures her neighbor’s correlative expectation of use and enjoyment. 110 Thus the expectation of use and enjoyment is reciprocal, both protecting and limiting property uses.
B. Property Remedies Expectations:
Property Rules and Liability Rules
Property expectations in the right to exclude and the right to use
and enjoy would be of little good without government-enforced remedies. 111 After all, without the government remedying infringements of
property expectations, our property system would amount to nothing

105. Stewart E. Sterk, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Uncertainty About Property
Rights, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1285, 1296 (2008).
106. See Joan Williams, The Rhetoric of Property, 83 IOWA L. REV. 277, 281 (1998)
(“[A]n important distinction exists between the (political and legal) rhetoric of absolute
property rights and the practice of limited ones.” (emphasis in original)); see also id. at 283
(“[The] intuitive image of absoluteness does not match social practice.”).
107. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435 (1982); Kaiser
Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179-80 (1979); see also Thomas W. Merrill, Property
and The Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 730, 735 (1998).
108. See, e.g., Merrill, supra note 107, at 749.
109. Id. at 754.
110. As the maxim sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas instructs, generally one must
not use property in such a way as to injure the lawful rights of one’s neighbors. 57A AM.
JUR. 2D Negligence § 89 (1989).
111. See, e.g., Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules,
and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1090 (1972) (noting
that society must enforce the choice of property entitlements).
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more than “might makes right.” 112 Therefore, a key part of property
rights expectations is the expectation of remedies.
As famously categorized, there are two types of remedies available
to protect property expectations: property-rule remedies and liabilityrule remedies. 113 Property-rule remedies are more absolute and leave
more autonomy with the holder of the right. If someone wishes to infringe upon a right protected by a property rule, that person “must
buy it from him in a voluntary transaction in which the value of the
entitlement is agreed upon by the seller.” 114 Thus, when protected by
a property right, the property owner has complete authority to veto
any infringement on his rights, and courts will use injunctive relief to
protect these rights.
Liability-rule remedies, on the other hand, leave a property holder
with less autonomy and control. Rather, a liability-rule protected
right will give way when a third party is “willing to pay an objectively determined value for it.” 115 Under liability-rule protection, a property holder does not have an absolute veto power; payment of monetary damages will be sufficient to compromise his property right.
Though the traditional dichotomy for remedies is between property-rule and liability-rule schemes, a third option is available: the
“no-liability rule,” which offers no legal remedy for infringement on
property rights. 116
These different types of remedies significantly and concretely impact a property owner’s autonomy and, as discussed below, the owner’s practical exercise of rights such as exclusion or use of the property. An important component of a property’s owner’s expectations is,
therefore, not only the rights available but also the remedy to enforce
those rights. A property owner’s expectation may include the absolute protection of a property rule, and since “real property law is generally marked by a preference for property rules rather than liability
rules,” 117 such a robust expectation is reasonable. This expected remedy comports with autonomy concepts underlying much of our property law and includes the advantages of “encouraging investment,
facilitating market exchange, and protecting subjective value.” 118
Nonetheless, in some cases—particularly those involving conflicting beneficial uses of neighboring properties or government programs
112. Id.
113. See id. at 1092.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Sterk, supra note 105, at 1316 (“The discussion of property rules and liability
rules has ignored a third alternative: impose no liability . . . .”).
117. Id. at 1319.
118. Id. at 1335.
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facing problems of coordinating multiple parties 119—property owners
might expect only liability-rule protection. Normally, however, a liability-rule remedy is the minimum expected remedy. Since violations
of property rights nearly always occasion some type of remedy
(thereby avoiding being reduced to a “might makes right” system),
no-liability rules are typically outside the realm of expectation. 120
Therefore, as detailed below, courts typically enforce the right to
exclude and the right to use and enjoy with property-rule schemes.
While courts occasionally employ liability-rule remedies in certain
circumstances, no-liability schemes are a remarkable rarity in the
context of property expectations. Accordingly, property expectations
have developed to include not only rights—those of exclusion and of
use and enjoyment—but also particular remedies—frequently property rules and sometimes liability rules.
1. Remedies Protecting the Right to Exclude
Courts normally enforce the right to exclude through property
rules, though in the takings context, where government action infringes on the right for a public purpose, courts apply a liability
rule. 121 For example, a strong property rule is the norm for protecting
the right to exclude against private individuals. Thus if a third party
infringes on a property owner’s right to exclude, the property owner
need not even demonstrate harm 122 to enforce her right through trespass and may enjoin future or repeated trespasses. 123
As against governmental entities acting in their sovereign capacity, the right to exclude is enforced through a liability rule guaranteed
by the Fifth Amendment takings doctrine, preventing the government from taking private property for public use without just
compensation. 124 The Fifth Amendment guards property rights
against both regulatory takings (i.e., government regulation that
goes too far) 125 and physical takings (i.e., physical invasion) of pri119. Id. (“Even the most fervent advocates of property rule protection, however, have
recognized that context is critical. Sometimes, an exclusive focus on market ordering would
lead to unacceptable inefficiencies.”); see also Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 111.
120. Sterk, supra note 105, at 1316 (noting that a no-liability scheme “appears inconsistent with any notion of property rights because it leaves an ‘owner’ with no recourse
against an encroacher”).
121. See, e.g., Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 111, at 1093 (“Taney’s house may be
protected by a property rule in situations where Marshall wishes to purchase it [or] by a
liability rule where the government decides to take it by eminent domain . . . .”)
122. See, e.g., Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc., 563 N.W.2d 154, 159-60 (Wis. 1997)
(noting that violation of the owners’ property right is, in itself, actual harm).
123. See, e.g., Baker v. Howard Cnty. Hunt, 188 A. 223, 230-31 (Md. 1936) (outlining
the court’s jurisdiction to enjoin continuing or repeated trespass).
124. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
125. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
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vate property; 126 there are separate legal inquiries, however, for the
two contexts. 127
In determining whether a compensable regulatory taking has occurred, the court generally employs the Penn Central analysis to determine if regulation has gone too far in limiting private property
rights. 128 This test examines investment-backed expectations, diminution of value, and character of government action. 129 It is a factintensive and ad hoc process with each case turning on its own
circumstances, but the right to exclude remains important to the
inquiry regarding both the character of government action 130 and
the investment-backed expectation. In fact, the right to exclude
plays such a prominent role that infringement on this right can create a taking even when the economic impact is small. As Joseph
Singer has described:
[T]he Court has sometimes held that property owners’ right to exclude others from property is so fundamental to ownership that
government action limiting that right is a taking regardless of the
overall effect on the value or use of the property. Thus, in Kaiser
Aetna v. United States, the Court held that imposing the longrecognized navigational servitude, allowing public access to navigable waters, on a private marina that became navigable because
of private development, required compensation under the takings
clause. And in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, the Court
held that state imposition of an easement for public access to
beachfront property constituted a taking requiring compensation.
In neither case was the overall effect on the value or use of the
property deemed relevant to whether a taking had occurred.
Rather, under the Court’s conceptual severance reasoning, simply
because an important strand in the bundle of property rights,
here the right to exclude, had been taken, a taking was found to
have occurred. 131

While the regulatory takings framework considers the right to exclude as an important component of its balancing test, in the physical
takings context the right to exclude is the paramount concern. When
the government physically invades property, no matter how small the
126. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435 (1982).
127. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302,
324 (2002).
128. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978); John D. Echeverria, Is Regulation of Water a Constitutional Taking?, 11 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 579, 591
(2010).
129. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124-25; see also Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 315 n.10.
130. John D. Echeverria, Making Sense of Penn Central, 23 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y
171, 186 n.59 (2009).
131. Joseph William Singer & Jack M. Beermann, The Social Origins of Property, 6
CAN. J. L. & JURISPRUDENCE 217, 223 (1993) (footnotes omitted).
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physical incursion, the court directly vindicates the right to exclude
by recognizing a per se taking. 132 The physical occupation of even a
single square foot of property arises to a per se taking 133 because
“constitutional protection for the rights of private property cannot be
made to depend on the size of the area permanently occupied.” 134 The
Court held as much in Loretto, explaining that “a physical invasion is
a government intrusion of an unusually serious character” 135 and “the
most serious form of invasion of an owner’s property interests.” 136 To
protect against such invasions, which strike at the heart of the right
to exclude, the court evaluates physical takings not through a balancing test but rather through a formalistic single question. 137 The court
simply asks whether there is a physical occupation of the property or
not, and if there is then it is a compensable taking. Hence, while all
Fifth Amendment takings law protects property through liability
rules, the formalistic standard for physical takings can be seen as
an even more protective version of the liability rule. With per se
takings the court protects the core right to exclude with a “strict
liability” rule. 138
Courts have not shied from applying this strict-liability per se takings doctrine; rather, they have routinely found physical takings
when government actors have entered or mandated entry by third
parties onto private land. 139 For example, the Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit found a physical taking when the Environmental
Protection Agency mandated that a property owner allow government agents to access his land and install wells for monitoring
groundwater contamination. 140 In a similar case, the court held that
the Border Patrol had committed a physical taking by “assuming sta132. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 322.
133. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435 (1982).
134. Id. at 436-37.
135. Id. at 433.
136. Id. at 435.
137. Singer & Beermann, supra note 131, at 225 (Loretto “formalistically identifies the
‘right to exclude’ as a core property right which cannot be taken or infringed without compensation. It therefore provides a paradigm case of the Court’s formalistic, natural rights
approach to the takings clause.”).
138. Abraham Bell, Not Just Compensation, 13 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 29, 55
(2003).
139. While in a few instances courts have allowed limited physical incursions without
takings protection, these typically occur only in the case of countervailing constitutional
rights. See, e.g., Marc R. Poirier, The Virtue of Vagueness in Takings Doctrine, 24 CARDOZO
L. REV. 93, 108 n.56 (2002) (citing illustrative cases to show compromises of the right to
exclude in the face of countervailing rights).
140. Hendler v. United States, 175 F.3d 1374, 1377-78 (Fed. Cir. 1999). The court,
however, found that the landowners were due no compensation for the taking because the
special benefits conferred by the pollution remediation and monitoring offset the compensation that would be owed. See id. at 1379-83.
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tionary positions on [Plaintiff’s] land, creating new roads, constructing a permanent tented structure on [Plaintiff’s] land, and installing
underground motion-detecting sensors.” 141
In sum, courts have consistently enforced property owners’ right
to exclude expectations against private parties through strong property rules. While the takings doctrine reduces protection to a liability
rule in the case of government infringement on the right to exclude,
in the case of physical invasions courts protect the right with a per se
strict-liability rule. As a result, property expectations in the right to
exclude include the expectations of property-rule and strict-liabilityrule remedies to enforce that right.
2. Remedies Protecting the Right to Use and Enjoy
The right to use and enjoy is also protected by a combination of
property and liability rules. When a private party infringes on the
right, a property owner has at least a liability-rule remedy and may
even have a property-rule remedy. When the government infringes
on the right, the landowner is protected by liability rules.
Of course, for a property owner to receive any of these remedies
she must show an infringement on her right, which is more complicated in the right to use and enjoy context than it is in the right to
exclude context. Unlike infringements on the right to exclude, which
manifest in fairly absolute and physical scenarios, infringements on
the right to use and enjoy involve a balancing of correlative rights.
For example, determination of whether a neighbor’s actions infringe
on a landowner’s right to use her property involves balancing the
neighbor’s usage rights against the landowner’s usage rights. 142 In
such a balancing test, the landowner may not be as certain to demonstrate an infringement as she would in the right to exclude context. 143
For example, to establish a nuisance—the primary cause of action for
challenging interference with the right to use and enjoy—a property
owner must show that a third party has acted unreasonably and in
doing so infringed on the property’s owner’s right to use and enjoy
her land. 144 This nuisance inquiry usually requires a fact-specific determination of reasonableness and balancing of conflicting uses. 145
Though the nuisance inquiry may be murky and contextual, the
ability to bring nuisance suits represents an important property ex141. Otay Mesa Prop., L.P. v. United States, 670 F.3d 1358, 1361, 1365 (Fed. Cir.
2012).
142. THOMAS W. MERRILL & HENRY E. SMITH, PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 27
(2d ed. 2012).
143. Id.
144. See id.
145. Id.
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pectation, namely the possibility of vindicating the right to use and
enjoy and the possibility of receiving a remedy for infringements of
those rights. In fact, the expectation of the right to bring a nuisance
suit, as well as the corollary expectation that a property owner may
not create a nuisance, are so long-held and fundamental as to be considered background principles of property law. 146
Assuming that a landowner could show that a nuisance is occurring and thus demonstrate an infringement on her right to use and
enjoy, a property-rule remedy—injunctive relief—was traditionally
expected. 147 In modern times, however, courts have held that a liability-rule remedy is sufficient to vindicate the right to use and enjoy in
certain situations. 148 In nuisance cases where the offending use has
sufficient social utility, for example, courts have allowed monetary
damages in place of injunctive relief. 149 Therefore, as against interference by private parties, the right to use and enjoy is usually protected by a property rule, though the court may substitute a liability
rule in certain situations. 150
On the other hand, when a government entity infringes on the
right to use and enjoy, the Fifth Amendment takings doctrine imposes a liability-rule remedy. As discussed above, the court will apply
the Penn Central balancing test to determine if a restriction on the
right to use and enjoy rises to the level of a taking, and if so, monetary compensation is due. For example, Penn Central itself dealt with
a restriction on the right to use property, ultimately concluding that
a limitation on development above Grand Central Station did not
amount to a taking of property. Lucas also considered a limit on the
right to use property, holding that a regulation completely foreclosing
development and removing all value from a property was a per se
taking and awarding monetary damages to vindicate the infringement on the right to use.
Thus property owners can seek to protect their right to use and
enjoy either through a nuisance action, as against a private party, or
a takings claim, as against a government entity. While in both instances courts employ a balancing test to determine whether there is
a compensable infringement on the right to use and enjoy, regardless
of the result of the balancing, an important property expectation is
the ability to seek vindication of these rights in court. Further, if a
146. Robin Kundis Craig, Public Trust and Public Necessity Defenses to Takings Liability for Sea Level Rise Responses on the Gulf Coast, 26 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 395, 402
(2011).
147. See, e.g., Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. 1970).
148. Id. at 875.
149. See id. at 872-75.
150. See generally id.
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property owner succeeds in either of these claims, the right to use
and enjoy is protected by at least a liability rule.
C. Conflicts Between Aggressive Renewable Energy Policies
and Property Expectations
Aggressive policies to encourage renewable energy, whether
through mandates or limitations on neighbors’ ability to interfere
with renewables projects, create tension with expectations and remedies regarding the right to exclude and the right to use and enjoy.
Specifically, these policies can conflict with expectations by altering
remedies from property rules to liability rules or by instituting noliability rules. By altering these remedy expectations, these policies
effectively alter property owners’ substantive rights to exclude and
rights to use and enjoy, and they breed legal challenges, particularly
in the form of takings claims.
For example, policies mandating distributed generation or microgrid installation 151 run up against expectations regarding the right
to exclude and the right to use and enjoy because such mandates, to
the extent that they do not provide for compensation, 152 impose a
no-liability rule for infringements of these rights. A property owner
who is compelled to install solar panels or windmills or to join a
microgrid may object that this physically invades her property or limits her right to use and enjoy it. Moreover, the property owner’s argument will be even stronger if a policy requires her to install commonly owned or third-party-owned equipment on her property. 153
Normally the property owner could expect property-rule protection
(via trespass) against the third party’s encroachment, and to the extent that the government compelled such invasion, the property owner would expect at least liability-rule protection through a takings
claim. Indeed, multiple scholars have suggested that while government policies mandating renewables would effectively advance renewables productivity, distributed generation installation, and microgrid development, 154 takings claims represent a major impediment
to these policies. 155
Furthermore, policies that limit neighbors’ rights to challenge or
interfere with renewable energy projects also create tensions with
151. See discussion supra Part II.C.1.
152. These proposals do not provide for compensation likely because they would become
impossibly expensive.
153. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435 (1982)
(stressing that a third-party physical invasion occasions a taking); see also Bronin, supra
note 7, at 583.
154. See supra Part II.C.1.
155. Bronin, supra note 7, at 583.
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the right to use and enjoy. For example, laws precluding nuisance
suits against windmills or solar installations 156 alter a neighbor’s expectation in asserting her right to use and enjoy the property. Similarly, solar- or wind-rights regimes that prohibit certain activities,
such as installing structures that might shade a solar collector or interfere with wind passage, also limit exercise of rights to use and enjoy.
While the neighbor’s expectations regarding the right to use and
enjoy may be malleable and subject to a balancing test, a real and
important component of this expectation includes both the ability to
bring a legal challenge determining whether the right has been infringed and the possibility of receiving a remedy vindicating that
right. Laws that preclude such legal challenges ex ante, however, conflict with that expectation. By removing the ability to bring a suit,
these policies take away the possibility of a landowner receiving either a property-rule or liability-rule protection of the right. Instead,
these policies institute a de facto no-liability rule (if a neighbor cannot challenge an action, she is assured of getting no remedy). Again,
scholars have noted that to the extent such government policies interfere with property owners’ expectations regarding their rights and
remedies in the use and enjoyment of their property, takings claims
are likely to ensue. 157
IV. THE ENERGY/PROPERTY BALANCE:
DIMINISHED PROPERTY EXPECTATIONS IN THE ENERGY CONTEXT
Aggressive efforts to promote clean energy are not the first set of
energy-production measures to run up against core property expectations like the right to exclude and the right to use and enjoy. Rather,
many past energy policies and doctrines have altered rights and remedies for these fundamental property expectations, and legislatures
and courts have consistently compromised property expectations in
the face of energy needs. This Part recounts that tradition of compromise and describes the long history of decreased property expectations when energy development or production is at stake. Based on
the importance of developing energy resources, legislatures and
courts have recognized an energy/property balance whereby property
expectations give way to energy production.
In demonstrating this energy/property balance, this Part recounts
treatment of pre-electrical energy sources, electricity production and
156. See discussion supra Part II.C.2.
157. Bronin, supra note 101, at 82 (“[A] court might find that a regulatory taking was
effected on a property owner whose ability to infringe on her neighbors’ solar access was
unexpectedly eliminated by the adoption of the preexisting restrictions proposal because
the character of the restriction was far-reaching and reduced her property’s resale value,
and because the property owner purchased the property with the expectation that she
would not have such a restriction.”).
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provision via water, coal, and utilities, oil and gas production, and
even farming production.
A. Pre-Electrical Energy Sources: Firewood and Water
Even from the earliest moments in American history, when energy
production was more primitive, courts and legislatures curtailed
property expectations to strike an energy/property balance. For example, in colonial times a property holder’s right to exclude was limited to accommodate neighbors’ energy needs; neighbors had rights
over adjoining landowners to hunt and gather wood—both crucial
sources of energy at the time. 158 In fact, in a major blow to the right
to exclude, a generally held right to hunt on unenclosed land was
paramount even to a landowner’s express demand to the contrary. 159
The normal law of trespass simply did not apply in this context, and
the right to exclude that was normally protected by a property-rule
remedy was not even protected by a liability rule. Rather, a noliability rule meant that it was not protected at all in this context.
Additionally, the need to gather firewood for energy overcame the
otherwise rigid law of waste that governed a tenant’s right to use
land. 160 Under the English law of waste that first governed the American colonies, a landlord could expect that his tenant would return
the property to him unchanged, and a major application of this doctrine was to preclude the clearing of forests or cutting of wood. 161 This
restriction protected the landlord’s (or other future interest holder’s)
expectation in the right to use and enjoy that resource in the future,
and since the landlord could enjoin his tenant from committing
waste, this expectation was protected by a property rule. However,
one of the few exceptions to this English law of waste was that “tenants could take from the land . . . the timber that was necessary for
maintaining buildings, making tools, and warming themselves in
winter, called respectively ‘house bote,’ ‘tool bote,’ and ‘fire bote.’ ” 162
Hence, one of the few default exceptions to the landlord’s expectation,
the fire bote, was in the interest of energy production, and while the
landlord normally enjoyed property-rule protection to enjoin a tenant
158. FRED BOSSELMAN ET AL., ENERGY, ECONOMICS AND THE ENVIRONMENT 169 (3d ed.
2010) (“Ever since prehistoric humans discovered how to make fire they have been cutting
down trees to obtain wood as a fuel. Wood . . . continued to be the dominant source of energy until the mid-nineteenth century.”); Williams, supra note 106, at 282 (“An owner’s
neighbors also had substantial rights over his land—including the right to hunt, gather
wood, graze animals, pass over, and use water from his land—many of which were carried
over to the colonies and persisted well into the nineteenth century.”).
159. McConico v. Singleton, 9 S.C.L. (1 Mill) 244 (S.C. Ct. App. 1818).
160. See Jedediah Purdy, The American Transformation of Waste Doctrine: A Pluralist
Interpretation, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 653, 658 (2006).
161. Id. at 662-63.
162. Id. at 663.
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from waste, the fire bote created a no-liability rule in the case of
firewood energy production.
Like the gathering and burning of firewood, the use of water for
direct kinetic energy occasioned a similar energy/property balance.
Well before water was harnessed to generate electricity, it was an
important energy source in driving water mills that powered factories in both England and America, 163 and such mills were common in
America from the time of the colonies until after the 1850s. 164 Dam
construction ensured continuous water power for these mills, but the
dams also led to flooding and consequently to property conflicts between mill owners and their aggrieved neighbors. 165 To resolve such
conflicts in favor of continued waterpower, state legislatures passed
“mill acts,” which curtailed neighbors’ ability to challenge the mills
under common law property theories and instead provided the exclusive remedy for flooding. 166 For example, a 1795 Massachusetts statute allowed mill owners “to raise a dam and flood the land of his
neighbor, so long as he compensated him according to the procedures
established by the act.” 167 Typically such mill acts allowed neighbors
to receive only yearly damages for even permanent flooding. 168 Importantly, the acts also forced neighbors to forego more advantageous
common law property remedies. For example, the acts disallowed
neighbors from bringing trespass actions and thus foreclosed the opportunity for neighbors to enjoin the flooding. 169 In doing so, the acts
replaced the long-held property-rule expectations with mere liabilityrule damages, even when the flooding caused permanent physical
invasion. 170 Moreover, the acts not only removed the possibility of
punitive damages but also allowed a mill owner to escape all liability
if he could show that the dam benefitted the neighbor on the balance. 171 As a result, under certain scenarios the acts further diminished the protection of the right to exclude from a liability-rule remedy to a no-liability rule.

163. BOSSELMAN ET AL., supra note 158, at 117-18.
164. Id. at 118.
165. Id.
166. MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1780–1860, at 47
(1977).
167. Id. at 48.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. See id. at 48. Permanent physical trespass or repeated trespass have traditionally
been remedied with property-rule injunction. E.g., MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 142, at
44-57 (discussing Baker v. Howard Cnty. Hunt, 188 A. 223 (Md. 1936), and Pile v. Pedrick,
31 A. 647 (Pa. 1895)).
171. HORWITZ, supra note 166, at 48.
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In applying and justifying these acts, courts directly acknowledged
the compromise of property expectations in favor of important energy
resources. The Massachusetts Supreme Court noted that the acts
were “at variance with that absolute right of dominion and enjoyment which every proprietor is supposed by law to have in his own
soil.” 172 Nonetheless, the court justified the act’s adjustment of property expectations based on the social importance of the mills as energy resources. 173 The court further reasoned that the physical location
of the neighbors’ land on watercourses meant that the neighbors’
property expectation must bow to the common good of efficient energy production, stressing that the acts were “designed to provide for
the most useful and beneficial occupation and enjoyment of natural
streams and water-courses, where the absolute right of each proprietor, to use his own land and water privileges, at his own pleasure,
cannot be fully enjoyed, and one must of necessity, in some degree,
yield to the other.” 174
The mill acts offer an early example not only of the energy/property
balance limiting property expectations but also of courts and legislatures specifically adjusting the expectations of property owners physically located on or near desirable energy resources. As Morton Horwitz describes, these acts “offer some of the earliest illustrations of
American willingness to sacrifice the sanctity of private property in
the interest of promoting economic development” 175 and demonstrate
that “a conception of absolute and exclusive dominion over property
was incompatible with the needs of industrial development.” 176 In the
mill acts, legislatures and courts recognized that waterpower was too
important an energy resource to yield to neighboring property owners’ subjective values or inclination to hold out from cooperating. Accordingly, the legislatures and courts reshaped property expectations
to accommodate energy development.
B. Electricity Production and Provision: Water, Coal, and Utilities
As our primary energy base shifted to electricity, 177 legislatures
and courts again diminished expectations in the right to exclude and
the right to use and enjoy to facilitate electrical production and distribution. As coal became an important energy resource, first for
smaller in-home and early industrial uses and later for large-scale
172. Fiske v. Framingham Mfg. Co., 29 Mass. (1 Pick.) 68, 70 (1831).
173. Id. at 70-71.
174. Id. at 71.
175. HORWITZ, supra note 166, at 47.
176. Id.
177. See generally Pursley & Wiseman, supra note 1, at 884-86 (outlining the development of electricity as the nation’s primary energy source).
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production of electricity, lawmakers and courts repeatedly relied on
the energy/property balance to facilitate coal production. For example, in 1886 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that a private
property owner was entitled to neither an injunction nor even damages for water pollution caused by a neighboring coal mine, 178 thereby
imposing a no-liability rule in place of property-rule or at least liability-rule expectations. The court offered the same energy/property
balance reasoning used to justify the mill acts, holding that “mere
private personal inconveniences . . . must yield to the necessities of a
great public industry, which, although in the hands of a private corporation, subserves a great public interest. To encourage the development of the great natural resources of a country trifling inconveniences to particular persons must sometimes give way to the necessities of a great community.” 179
Courts continued to apply the energy/property balance to foster
coal production with the advent of new mining techniques. For example, in the 1950s, when surface mining 180 began to replace underground mining as the prevalent form of coal extraction, conflicts
arose because the surface mining interfered with the surface owners’
right to exclude and right to use and enjoy the land in ways that underground mining had not. Though the surface mining techniques
and impacts were not foreseen at the time the surface owners granted away their mineral rights, courts initially interpreted the mineralrights grants to mean that the surface owners could not prevent mineral-rights holders from surface mining. 181 Similarly, when underground coal mining shifted to the “longwall” technique that led to increased and immediate subsidence of surface estates, West Virginia
courts ruled that the change in technique did not impact the right of
subadjacent support. 182 These rulings demonstrate “the attitude
prevalent in the nineteenth century—that because coal was dramatically increasing peoples’ ability to produce goods and raise their
standard of living, the law ought to construe instruments in a way
that encouraged the production of this valuable commodity.” 183 In
178. Pa. Coal Co. v. Sanderson, 6 A. 453 (Pa. 1886).
179. Id. at 459.
180. Surface mining is also referred to as strip mining. In coal production, estates are
often split between the surface estate and the mineral estate. Klass, supra note 90, at 685
(“Much of the land in the Interior West is in “split-estate” ownership, meaning one party
owns the surface rights of the land and another party owns the subsurface and mineral
rights.”).
181. BOSSELMAN ET AL., supra note 158, at 201. In fact, when the Kentucky legislature
tried to limit surface mining by limiting mineral-rights holders to using techniques common at the time the mineral deeds were executed, the Kentucky Supreme Court invalidated the statute, and a constitutional amendment was enacted to change the practice. See id.
182. See id. at 202.
183. Id.
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both situations, the courts again adjusted surface-rights owners’ expectations to favor energy production by instituting a no-liability
scheme instead of protecting the right to exclude and the right to use
and enjoy with a property-rule or liability-rule remedy.
The development of hydropower also saw private property yield in
service of energy production. However, unlike the examples discussed
above, which utilized no-liability rules to advance energy development, hydropower developed through the use of liability rules. 184 Specifically, hydropower projects relied heavily on eminent domain authority exercised by federal entities like the Tennessee Valley Authority (“TVA”) and Bonneville Power Authority (“BPA”). 185 The hydroelectric dams created by the TVA and the BPA “displaced thousands of people, but the promised economic benefits of the new technology were so great that the minor hardship [of those compensated
to move] was widely seen as simply the price of progress.” 186 While a
government’s exercise of eminent domain power does not truly alter
property expectations, 187 the rationale for the TVA’s and BPA’s eminent domain authority reflects the same concepts underlying the energy/property balance: that private property must make way for energy development, especially when new technologies make production
more efficient.
More noteworthy than the government’s use of eminent domain
authority to install hydropower facilities is the government’s granting private entities eminent domain authority to facilitate energy development. Such grants represent another example of the energy/property balance shaping property expectations by changing the
remedy for third-party interference from a property-rule scheme to a
liability-rule scheme. For example, some state legislatures “have given broad authority to natural resource developers to exercise the
power of eminent domain directly to promote development of coal, oil,
gas, and other state natural resources.” 188 Importantly, these grants
of eminent domain power differ materially from the standard condemnation authority given to private entities. As Alexandra Klass
has observed, unlike the more common state grants of eminent domain power to railroads, power companies, or other common carriers
184. Interestingly, also unlike the examples discussed above, hydropower projects were
generally undertaken by the government as opposed to private parties.
185. Robert L. Bradley, Jr., The Origins of Political Electricity: Market Failure or Political Opportunism?, 17 ENERGY L.J. 59, 94-99 (1996).
186. BOSSELMAN ET AL., supra note 158, at 125.
187. As noted earlier, the rights to exclude and to use and enjoy only receive liabilityrule protection against government intrusion.
188. Klass, supra note 90, at 652; see also id. at 659 (“Statutes in Arizona, Colorado,
Idaho, Montana, Nevada, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Utah, and Wyoming
specifically grant eminent domain authority to private companies in connection with mining, oil and gas, and other natural resource development.”).

464

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41:435

for “use by the public,” eminent domain power exercised by private
energy developers “will not be subject to public access or public use
and is only ‘public’ in the sense that the resource development will
add to the growth of the overall state economy.” 189
This private eminent domain power is another example of legislatures striking the energy/property balance to promote development, 190 and courts have upheld these measures based on the importance of energy production. For example, in 1979 the Wyoming
Supreme Court interpreted a statute granting private eminent
domain power for “mining” to include authority for a private oil company to condemn land for oil and gas exploration and development. 191 The court justified its decision in part on the “great public
interest in an imminent need for energy.” 192 Under similar justifications, “federal law and the law in many states expressly delegates the
power of eminent domain to power companies and oil and gas companies for the construction of electric transmission lines and oil and
gas pipelines.” 193
In the same vein, the legal treatment of public utilities reflects the
prioritization of energy’s social values over private property expectations. Historically, as private property rights in electrical production
and distribution infrastructure led to natural monopolies, the industry was regulated and certain rights were restricted because of the
overarching social importance of electrical energy. Thus previously
private utility property was pushed into a “partly public, partly private status.” 194 Ratemaking replaced a purely property-rights-based
market, and the duty to serve customers replaced any right to exclude individuals from service. Moreover, this was all done under a
no-liability framework. Government regulators pressed utilities’
property interests into public service, but courts did not find this to
be a compensable taking so long as the rates set were not so low as to
be unjust, which was the case even when rates did not allow for com-

189. Id. at 659.
190. Id. at 661 (“Whenever eminent domain is authorized, it is a statement by a government authority that it wishes to promote the public interest through reallocation of
property rights in a context where it does not trust the market to reach an optimal result.
These statutes and constitutional provisions in the Interior West exist as a reflection of the
desire of these states to use their property laws to promote particular forms of economic
growth without interference from other private property interests.” (footnote omitted)).
191. Coronado Oil Co. v. Grieves, 603 P.2d 406 (Wyo. 1979).
192. Id. at 411; see also Klass, supra note 90, at 665.
193. Klass, supra note 90, at 675.
194. Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299, 307 (1989); see also id. (“Although
their assets are employed in the public interest to provide consumers of the State with
electric power, they are owned and operated by private investors.”).
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plete or timely recoupment of expenditures. 195 Moreover, despite the
fact that most utilities are privately owned, regulators can mandate a
minimum level of equipment and maximum level of output. 196 Regulators can require sufficient plant capacity to service peak load, even
if it is rarely used, or they can require certain providers to stop sending energy to the grid in instances of overproduction. 197 Under other
circumstances, such interference with the right to exclude or the
right to use private property would at least give rise to a claim for
compensation, but under the energy/property balance, “the publicprivate nature of shared energy” 198 allows the government to regulate
with a heavier hand without incurring compensation liability.
C. Oil and Gas Production
From their origins to the present day, oil and gas doctrines in the
United States also demonstrate how the energy/property balance affects property expectations. As a leading treatise has put it, “While
oil and gas have been justifiably regarded as private property in every state where discovered, their production, storage, and transportation have always been treated as being affected by public interest.” 199
In light of these public interest concerns, states have mandated conservation measures to encourage production and avoid waste of oil
and gas resources, and such measures include the nearly ubiquitous
state laws requiring compulsory pooling, 200 compulsory unitization,
and pipeline regulation. As discussed in detail below, each of these
measures alters expectations of the right to exclude or the right to
use and enjoy, but all have withstood takings analysis based on the
concept “that the private property rights of a mineral owner could be
constitutionally limited for the purpose of conserving the resource for
195. See Duquesne Light Co., 488 U.S. 209 (holding that a Pennsylvania law preventing
electricity providers from setting utility rates to reflect investments in as-yet-unused plant
did not violate the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment).
196. See, e.g., Janice A. Beecher, Economic Regulation of Utility Infrastructure, in
INFRASTRUCTURE AND LAND POLICIES 87, 88, 91-93, 102, 105, 108 (2013), available at
http://ipu.msu.edu/research/pdfs/Beecher%20Economic%20Regulation%20of%20Infrastruct
ure%20Lincoln%202013.pdf.
197. Id. at 92-93; Ted Sickinger, Too Much of a Good Thing: Growth in Wind Power
(July
17,
2010),
Makes
Life
Difficult
for
Grid
Managers,
OR. LIVE
http://www.oregonlive.com/business/index.ssf/2010/07/too_much_of_a_good_thing_growt.ht
ml (discussing curtailments of renewable energy production when spikes in generation
could overwhelm energy grids); Peaking Power Plants, WIS. PUB. SERV.,
http://www.wisconsinpublicservice.com/company/peaking.aspx (last visited Mar. 4, 2014)
(discussing peaking power plants).
198. Bronin, supra note 7, at 547.
199. KRAMER & MARTIN, supra note 62, § 3.02.
200. Id. § 3.02[1], [2] (“Compulsory pooling statutes exist today in all major producing
states except Kansas. . . . Compulsory unitization statutes were enacted in many of the
major oil-producing states during the 1950’s, so that today only Texas remains without a
compulsory unitization process.”).
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the public benefit.” 201 Thus, just as in other energy contexts, legislatures and courts have employed the energy/property balance to promote oil and gas development by instituting no-liability rules for otherwise compensable infringements on the right to exclude or the right
to use and enjoy.
As a baseline for examining these oil and gas conservation
measures, it is worth quickly reviewing the law of capture and correlative rights principles that underlie oil and gas law. In defining
ownership of oil and gas resources, states universally adopted the
rule of capture, which provides that “the owner of a tract of land acquires title to the oil and gas that is produced from wells drilled on
the tract even if it can be shown that the oil or gas migrated from adjoining lands.” 202 Consequently, if a tract owner can pump it, he owns
it, regardless of whether the oil or gas comes from under his land or
his neighbor’s. 203 This concept itself reflects a version of the energy/property balance because it encourages energy production via a
no-liability rule for draining oil or gas from under a neighbor’s
tract. 204 Under the rule of capture, the only option to protect your oil
and gas from your neighbor is to drill your own well and intercept the
oil and gas before it is drained away. 205
However, this rule of capture scheme causes two major problems:
overdrilling—too many wells drilled creating a higher capital cost
than necessary to drain the oil and gas reserve—and premature dis201. Id. § 3.02.
202. Id. at ch. 2 Scope.
203. Often surface and mineral rights are severed; however, this does not change the
analysis of the balance between neighboring property rights holders. Nonetheless, it is
worth noting the legal relationship when land is divided into “ ‘split estate’ ownership,
meaning one party owns the surface rights of [a tract] and another party owns the subsurface and mineral rights” underlying the tract, which demonstrates another example of
property expectations adjusted in favor of energy development such as mining or oil and
gas. Klass, supra note 90, at 685.
“Until recently, the law had been fairly settled with regard to the rights of mineral
owners and surface owners. As a matter of common law, the mineral estate was the ‘dominant’ estate and the mineral owner had the right to use that portion of the surface estate
reasonably necessary to develop the severed mineral interests. In addition, the owner of
the mineral right was not liable for surface damage in the absence of negligence unless
there was a contractual agreement to pay damages or a statute providing a right to damages. Moreover, any recoverable damages often were limited to damages to ‘crops’ and ‘improvements’ and did not include damages to natural vegetation, non-agricultural buildings,
or general loss of land value.” Id. at 686 (footnote omitted). Thus the common law expectation favored energy production, and while some states have passed statutes requiring mineral owners to make accommodations such as requiring advanced written notice to access
private lands for oil and gas operations or requiring agreements for surface use, the background property expectation remains that the mineral owner, with its interest in energy
production, has the dominant interest. See id. at 686-87.
204. See KRAMER & MARTIN, supra note 62, § 2.01 (describing the rule of capture as a
“non-liability” rule).
205. See id.
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sipation of the natural reservoir energy—that is, dissipation of the
pressure that would naturally push the oil and gas up the wellhead,
ultimately leading to a higher cost of production and inability to produce as much of the oil and gas in the reservoir. 206 In response to
these problems, state legislatures developed conservation regulations
to prevent physical and economic waste of oil and gas and to protect
tract holders’ correlative rights to produce their fair share of the energy resources under their land. 207 Central to these conservation regulations was the concept of well spacing for efficient drainage of oil
and gas reservoirs; by regulating spacing, conservation agencies can
regulate the number of wells over a reservoir and thereby prevent
overdrilling and premature dissipation. 208 However, since reservoir
shapes and spacing requirements do not necessarily track surfaceproperty boundaries, conservation measures frequently operate
across property lines and thus create tension with the right to exclude and the right to use.
Compulsory pooling offers a prime example of a legislatively enacted conservation measure curtailing the right to exclude. Most basically, pooling is cooperation by separate entities in a single well; it
involves combining property interests in separate tracts of land that
will all most efficiently be drained by a single well, regardless of differing ownership across property lines. 209 The separate tracts all contribute to the production cost of the well and share in the proceeds. 210
Pooling can be voluntary, which raises no affront to the right to
exclude or the right to use and enjoy, but when parties do not voluntarily agree to pool interests, state statutes can force certain tracts—
usually small or irregularly sized ones—to pool. 211 Such compulsion
infringes on the right to exclude and the right to use and enjoy because owners may be forced into a pool and thus forced to exploit
mineral resources that they do not wish to exploit. If a tract is part of
a pool, its minerals will be drained; the owner cannot choose to wait
to use those resources at a later date or to not use them at all. While
the tract owner is paid for the value of her share of the drained minerals, she receives no compensation for giving up her choice about
whether to drain them. Under this no-liability rule, the tract owner
effectively loses the right to exclude and the right to use and enjoy.

206. Id. § 2.02.
207. Id.
208. Id. § 3.02[4][b].
209. Id. § 6.01 (“A prerequisite of most pooling provisions is that there be two or more
separately owned tracts or interests located within a spacing or drilling unit.”).
210. Id. More precisely, the working-interest owners share the production costs and all
owners of rights in the minerals share the production. Id.
211. Id.

468

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41:435

Moreover, some states’ forced pooling regimes tread further on
non-consenting owners’ expectations by not only forcing development
of resources through compulsory pooling but also forcing nonconsenting owners to pay additional surcharges. 212 In such states,
non-consenters must not only pay their share of production costs out
of their share of oil and gas, but they must also compensate the operator for the risk of drilling a non-profitable well. 213 In these situations, there is double curtailment of property expectations; the nonconsenting owner not only loses her right to exclude mineral production from her tract after it is pooled, but she also has to pay a premium for choosing not to voluntarily enter the pool. As a result, not only
has her right to exclude vanished into a no-liability scheme after the
forced pooling occurs, but she also incurs a liability for using her
right to exclude. With this additional surcharge, the property owner
is fined for exercising her right to exclude even before the forced pooling has gone into effect. This form of compulsory pooling turns a
basic property expectation on its head: through a no-liability rule it
effectively erases the right to exclude entirely, and then it charges a
property owner for having attempted to exercise the right at all.
Compulsory unitization, which involves a similar concept to pooling but on a grander scale, limits the right to exclude in the same
way. While pooling focuses on the area that can be efficiently drained
by a single well, unitization consolidates differing interests in a
common supply (for example, consolidating the interests in an entire
oil field) to maximize production efficiency. 214 Thus a unitized area
may include many pooled units. 215 Again, like pooling, parties may
voluntarily unitize and benefit from the efficiency gains. 216 However,
despite the economic advantages, such voluntary unitization rarely
occurs due to coordination or holdout problems, so state legislatures
have enacted compulsory unitization statutes to force non-consenting
interests to unitize. 217 Like in the pooling context, some states
also impose unitization risk penalties, forcing non-consenting parties
to pay more than their share of the cost of production. 218 For example, Tennessee imposes a risk penalty up to 350 percent. 219 Just as
212. While some states allow for a “free rider” approach, where the non-consenting
owners’ share of production costs is subtracted from their share of production, other states
impose a risk penalty on non-consenters. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id. § 6.02.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id. For compulsory unitization, statutes typically require at least a minimum percentage of interests to consent. Id.
218. Id.
219. TENN. COMP. R. & REGS. 0400-55-01-.01(1)(d) (2013).
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with forced pooling, this penalty deals a double blow to the right
to exclude.
In addition to curtailing the conceptual right to exclude and right
to use, compulsory pooling and unitization statutes also eliminate
property owners’ rights to exclude physical entry or occupation
of their property. Numerous physical invasions can arise when properties are pooled or unitized. For example, the optimal surface or
bottomhole 220 location of a well may require physical invasion of a
tract that has been forced into the pooling or unitization (i.e., has not
consented to either draining oil or physical invasion) or on a tract
that has voluntarily joined the pool for purposes of draining its oil
but has not otherwise agreed to surface or subsurface physical invasion. 221 Alternatively, even if the surface well or bottomhole is not
located on one of these non-consenting tracts, the oil or gas production operations may still physically invade the non-consenting land
for access or production-related activities. 222 In such instances, courts
frequently find uncompensated, implied easements over the nonconsenting land for production activities because the purpose of the
pooling and unitization would otherwise be defeated. 223 Hence, even
though the well operator would be physically trespassing on the nonconsenting land in the absence of the unitization or pooling statutes,
courts have held that there is no trespass under the unitization or
pooling schemes. 224
In sum, through unitization and pooling, legislatures and courts
have eliminated expectations that the right to exclude physical invasions is protected by property rules or strict-liability per se taking
220. “Bottomhole” refers to “[t]he lowest or deepest part of a well.” 8-B WILLIAMS &
MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW, B Terms (2013). One can think of this as the furthest physical
extent of the well.
221. 2 KRAMER & MARTIN, supra note 62, § 20.06[1] (“The optimum surface or bottomhole location of the unit well might be on the land of an unleased owner or an owner who
has not consented to pooling or unitization.”).
222. Id. (“There may be need for use of land within a unit for access to the unit well
and for production related activities ranging from treatment plants to oil tanks to gathering lines.”).
223. Id. (“If a unit operator is unable to gain access to and unable to use the land for
unit operations . . . the purposes sought to be attained by the state conservation order may
be defeated. Pooling and unitization are generally favored, so it is not surprising that the
courts frequently find that there is an implied easement to use the land for unit operations
. . . or that an order of the conservation agency gives the right of use for unit operations.”).
224. Id. (“The question arises, however, whether the unit operator will be able to make
use of the land of an unleased owner whose interest has been included in the unit and will
share in the production from the unit well. Unless the unit order provides a defense, use of
the surface or subsurface would be a trespass. . . . The courts that have ruled on this issue
have concluded that the unit order will prevent the unit operations from constituting a
trespass.”); see also id. (“The cases that have taken up the implied rights issue have almost
uniformly concluded that the mineral rights owner may use the lands for unit activities
whether the unit well was on or off the land burdened by the mineral interest.”).
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rules. Instead, they have installed no-liability rules. State legislatures require not only that non-consenting landowners submit to development of their oil-and-gas resources but also that landowners
endure physical invasion of the surface of their land 225 or of the subsurface. 226 As long as the physical invasion is done for oil and gas
production 227 under the pooling or unitization scheme, 228 no compensation is owed for the physical incursion or use of the land, 229 and
225. For example, New Mexico recognizes rights of well operators to enter and use the
surface or land within a unit even when not part of the operator’s lease; however, it does
not extend the same protection to non-unitized portions of the same tract, where such entry
would be trespass. Kysar v. Amoco Prod. Co., 93 P.3d 1272, 1282 (N.M. 2004) (“We hold
that under New Mexico law a mineral lessee’s implied surface right of reasonable ingress
and egress to reach a well located inside the production unit that the lessee is operating
pursuant to a pooling arrangement extends across lease boundaries within the unit to the
surface of the entire area subject to the arrangement, regardless of where within the unit
production is taking place.”); id. at 1273 (“[A] mineral rights lessee does not, by virtue of
having entered into a communitization agreement with the permission of the prior fee
owner, enjoy a right of access over the surface estate of the portion of the leased area that
is not subject to the agreement.”).
226. Moreover, most states that produce oil and gas find that physical invasion of the
subsurface of the land is not a trespass. For example, “the North Dakota Supreme Court
has joined the other producing states [sic] courts that have ruled that when a unit operator
has drilled the unit well in accordance with the orders and regulations of the state conservation agency, the agency authorization will preclude a suit by the landowner in trespass,
even though the well bore may enter the landowner’s property at a subsurface location.” 2
KRAMER & MARTIN, supra note 62, § 20.06[1][f] (citing Cont’l Res., Inc. v. Farrar Oil Co.,
559 N.W.2d 841 (1997)). The North Dakota court was clear that even though the tract was
forced-pooled and suffered a subsurface physical invasion, that did not amount to trespass
or a compensable claim because the forced pooling statute superseded such property law
principles. Id. (“[The] forced pooling order was a proper exercise of the state’s police power
that superseded the property law of trespass. So long as Continental complied with the
rules and regulations of the Industrial Commission in drilling the well, the forced pooling
order would preclude any claim by Farrar against Continental for a subsurface trespass
even though the horizontal hole would transect much of Farrar’s leased formation in the
southwest quarter. The court stated that ‘property law is necessarily superseded’ by the
Resources Act under which the pooling was undertaken, and to hold otherwise would ‘frustrate the purposes of the North Dakota Resources Act and would make an Industrial
Commission’s forced pooling order ineffectual.’ ” (quoting Cont’l Res., 559 N.W.2d at 846)).
227. When such invasions have not been pursuant to oil and gas production, the courts
have not allowed the incursions without the payment of damages. Despite finding such an
implied usage right for oil and gas production on unitized tracts, though, a New Mexico
appeals court did not find an implied easement for a groundwater pollution monitoring
well associated with the oil and gas extraction. See Smith & Marrs, Inc. v. Osborn, 180
P.3d 1183 (N.M. Ct. App. 2008).
228. Incursions to land for non-production reasons or to non-unitized tracts receive no
such immunity See Kysar, 93 P.3d at 1282 (“We hold that under New Mexico law a mineral
lessee’s implied surface right of reasonable ingress and egress to reach a well located inside
the production unit that the lessee is operating pursuant to a pooling arrangement extends
across lease boundaries within the unit to the surface of the entire area subject to the arrangement, regardless of where within the unit production is taking place.”); id. at 1273
(“[A] mineral rights lessee does not, by virtue of having entered into a communitization
agreement with the permission of the prior fee owner, enjoy a right of access over the surface estate of the portion of the leased area that is not subject to the agreement.”).
229. The only case that implies compensation is due for the mere use of land without
damages is Cormack v. Wil-Mc Corp., 661 P.2d 525 (Okla. 1983), but, as addressed in the
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even if there is physical damage to the property, the nonconsenting
landowner will only be compensated to the extent that she can prove
actual surface damages. 230 The right to exclude goes unprotected, and
next footnote, that analysis is grounded in the idea of surface damages rather than the
right to exclude or takings, and the case has since been superseded by Oklahoma’s surface
damages act, which again focuses on damages rather than compensation for use. See 1
WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 220, § 218.
230. For example, the Louisiana Supreme Court has “held the enactment of conservation regulation statutes superseded the general concept of ownership of the subsurface of
land. When a unit has been created by order of the Commissioner of Conservation, a legally
actionable trespass has not occurred by the operator who drills the well.” 2 KRAMER &
MARTIN, supra note 62, § 20.06[1][d] (citing Nunez v. Wainoco Oil & Gas Co., 488 So. 2d
955 (La. 1986)). In a footnote in that case, the court observed that damages might be required if they could be proven, but held nothing was due to the owner because there were
no observable surface consequences of the physical invasion two miles below the surface.
See Nunez, 488 So. 2d at 964-65 n.29. Thus the court did not require compensation for the
physical invasion but instead tied it to the showing of actual damages. A subsequent case
in federal district court in Louisiana observed that Nunez relied on “the precise nature of
unitization, that is, the creation of correlative rights and the redefining of traditional property lines, which justifies precluding an action in trespass.” Mongrue v. Monsanto Co., No.
98-2531, 1999 WL 219774, at *14 (E.D. La. Apr. 9, 1999).
Similarly, “[t]he Oklahoma cases in general have recognized a power of the operator under a unit order to use land in connection with unit operations even when the owner
has not consented to the use of the land.” 2 KRAMER & MARTIN, supra note 62,
§ 20.06[1][d]. Oklahoma courts have dismissed suits challenging access to land for unit
operations on the grounds that “[i]f plaintiff’s contentions [challenging access] were upheld,
the whole intent and purpose of the unitization law could be defeated by one or more recalcitrant surface owners within a unit area. As we interpret the law, the Unit Operator has
the right to use any surface within the unit for the purpose of efficiently carrying out the
approved unit plan, so long as such use is reasonable and not unduly burdensome to any
particular surface area.” Nelson v. Texaco Inc., 525 P.2d 1263, 1266 (Okla. 1974) (citation
omitted).
Additionally, while Oklahoma has ruled that a “force-pooled, unleased landowner
has a legal right to damages for use of his land by the operator of the unit well,” this was
not a takings or trespass claim but merely one for surface damage. 2 KRAMER & MARTIN,
supra note 62, § 20.06[1][d]. Moreover, since that time, Oklahoma, as well as a number of
other states, has “enacted surface damages acts requiring operators to compensate surface
owners for loss of future use of the land, the market value of crops destroyed, and diminution in the value of the surface.” 1 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 220, § 218. Again, these
statutes are not aimed at protecting or compensating for physical use or invasion but rather are designed to compensate for actual damage caused, and absent the statute, the
surface owner would not even be able to recover for the actual damages, much less the
physical invasion or trespass. But cf. id. § 218.11 (“Many contemporary leases and deeds
contain express provision requiring the mineral owner or lessee to compensate the surface
owner ‘for all damages done in said operation to the lands, trees, shrubs or to any structure, or to any livestock thereon.’ Such a provision may be of particular importance to a
lessor who joins in a community lease or whose lease contains authority for pooling or unitization, inasmuch as he may otherwise be unfairly dealt with if the well drilled under the
community lease or pooling or unitization agreement is upon his land, in which event he
will suffer all the surface damage and yet be entitled only to a proportionate share of the
royalties.” (quoting Meyer v. Cox, 252 S.W.2d 207, 208 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952))); id. § 218.12
(“An oil and gas lease or an instrument severing minerals from the surface may by express
provision impose an obligation on the lessee or mineral owner to restore the condition of
the premises after cessation of mineral operations.”); see also 2 KRAMER & MARTIN, supra
note 62, § 20.06[1] (“Of course, there is a distinction between payment for damages to land
and payment for use. However, loss of use and damage can closely approximate one another . . . .”). The treatise authors also endorse a view that there should be compensation in
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the only relief remaining is a common tort duty to reimburse for actual harm caused.
Comparing the results of forced pooling and unitization with cases
discussed above in the context of typical property expectations further illustrates the significance of the energy/property balance on
property rights and remedies. For example, while mandatory installation of EPA’s water quality monitoring wells on private property
constituted a physical taking, mandatory installation of third-party
oil and gas production wells on private property is not a compensable
taking under forced pooling and unitization schemes. In fact, New
Mexico courts have ruled that compulsory installation of water monitoring wells to record pollution from oil and gas production requires
compensation, while the compulsory drilling of the oil and gas production wells under a unitization scheme does not. 231 This side-byside comparison of typical property expectations versus energy/
property balance expectations shows the stark difference.
Oil and gas pipeline regulation demonstrates a similar curtailment of the right to exclude. Oil and gas fields—particularly those
focused on natural gas production—can be at the mercy of pipelines
that, as the only methods of conveying gas from the fields, hold monopsony 232 power. 233 To prevent pipeline owners from causing waste
or inefficiency by failing to coordinate with other parties, strategically holding out for higher prices, or excluding certain interests outright, 234 regulations require pipelines “to purchase and take ratably
oil or gas from each well in a reservoir or on the purchaser’s pipeline
either case, but the courts have yet to implement such a view. Id. (“The courts that have
ruled on this issue have concluded that the unit order will prevent the unit operations from
constituting a trespass. Nevertheless, damages should be available to the landowner
who has been force-pooled and whose land has been used for unit activities. . . . [W]e believe compensation needs to be paid when the land is used without formal consent being
provided.”).
231. See Smith & Marrs, Inc. v. Osborn, 180 P.3d 1183 (N.M. Ct. App. 2008).
232. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1098 (9th ed. 2009) (“Monopsony [is defined as a]
market situation in which one buyer controls the market . . . . ‘Monopsony is often thought
of as the flip side of monopoly. A monopolist is a seller with no rivals; a monopsonist is a
buyer with no rivals. A monopolist has power over price exercised by limiting output. A
monopsonist also has power over price, but this power is exercised by limiting aggregate
purchases. Monopsony injures efficient allocation by reducing the quantity of the input
product or service below the efficient level.’ ” (quoting LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN & WARREN
S. GRIMES, THE LAW OF ANTITRUST: AN INTEGRATED HANDBOOK 137-38 (2000))).
233. See KRAMER & MARTIN, supra note 62, § 5.04[1].
234. Id. (“Physical waste can occur, particularly in circumstances where the gas in
question is associated gas, when a pipeline does not take ratably from a reservoir because
an owner of a well in competition with other wells will find it necessary to flare natural gas
in order to produce the oil. As a further measure for the prevention of physical waste, some
states have not only required ratable taking but have established a priority of takes, so
that a pipeline must take gas on its system so as to limit the necessity of flaring gas in
order to produce oil or to take gas first from distressed wells or wells that would become
uneconomic if the gas flow were to diminish.”).
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system.” 235 Thus the pipeline regulations expressly eliminate the
pipeline owners’ right to exclude since the pipeline must not only
transport but also purchase a third party’s oil or gas. Again, laws
forcing a property owner to submit to physical invasion by a third
party normally occasions a per se taking protected by a strict-liability
rule, but pipeline regulations reduce this expectation to a no-liability
rule for the physical invasion and even impose an obligation to purchase the third party’s oil or gas.
Each of these oil-and-gas conservation measures has been challenged as a compensable taking of private property, and each has
survived based on energy/property balance reasoning. 236 In finding no
compensable takings, courts have deferred to the states’ valid exercise of the police power to prevent the waste of crucial energy resources 237 and have repeatedly held that “the private property rights
of a mineral owner [can] be constitutionally limited for the purpose of
conserving the resource for the public benefit.” 238
Further, though most of these oil and gas conservation programs
survived their constitutional challenges before the modern takings
era, 239 the manifestation of the energy/property balance in the oil and
gas context has continuing effect and increasing relevance as fracking assumes a more important role in the United States’ energy portfolio. 240 Fracking is a method of oil and gas extraction that involves
235. Id.
236. See Champlin Refining Co. v. Corp. Comm’n of Okla., 51 F.2d 823, 824-25, 838
(W.D. Okla. 1931) (upholding prorationing measures); Palmer Oil Corp. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 231 P.2d 997, 1004-05 (Okla. 1951) (upholding compulsory unitization statutes);
Patterson v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 77 P.2d 83, 95 (Okla. 1938) (upholding compulsory
pooling statutes). Thus as a leading treatise has put it, “It is well beyond cavil that state
conservation statutes will be upheld under a per se equal protection, taking, or due process
argument.” 2 KRAMER & MARTIN, supra note 62, § 24.01. Moreover, in the limited instances
where courts have found oil and gas conservation statutes to create as-applied takings, the
courts focused on complete prohibitions on energy production that denied all economically
valuable uses of lands and were not centered on a right-to-exclude analysis. See id. Therefore, in the oil and gas context, the courts have found takings only when production is impeded but not when land boundaries are compromised to encourage production.
237. KRAMER & MARTIN, supra note 62, § 3.02. For example, in the leading case on the
matter, Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana, 177 U.S. 190 (1900), the United States Supreme Court
emphasized that a state’s police power allowed it to prevent the waste of energy resources
and allowed state legislatures to define property rights not to include wasteful extraction of
the resources. Id. at 210-11. Similarly, in Champlin Refining Co. v. Corp. Commission of
Oklahoma, 286 U.S. 210 (1932), the Court again recognized that the property interests in
the capture of oil and gas did not encompass the right to waste hydrocarbons. Id. at 233-34.
238. KRAMER & MARTIN, supra note 62, § 3.02.
239. 2 id. § 24.01[2].
240. See, e.g., Hannah Wiseman, Urban Energy, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1793, 1795-97
(2013) (noting that the vast quantities of oil and gas available through fracking techniques
have set the United States “on track to be one of the world’s largest oil producers and
a major exporter of natural gas, something few would have predicted only a few years
earlier”).
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drilling wells vertically down some distance, then turning horizontally to follow productive reservoirs; such wells may extend a great horizontal distance across numerous property lines. 241 As described
above, while in other contexts this subsurface invasion would appear
to be a trespass, if committed by a private entity, or a physical taking, if mandated by the government. However, in the energy context
courts have held that it is not a compensable violation of property
rights. As recently as 2008, the Texas Supreme Court reaffirmed that
subsurface physical invasions from fracking fall under the same noliability scheme discussed above. 242 From the earliest doctrines encouraging oil and gas development to the most recent contests over
fracking, the pattern has been simple and consistent: when energy
development and production is at stake, the energy/property balance
will adjust private property expectations to accommodate.
D. Farm Production
Finally, even legislative measures to resolve conflicts between
property expectations and farm production reflect the energy/property balance at work. While farming may not fall entirely
within the vernacular conception of energy, biofuel production, particularly ethanol, is emerging as a non-negligible energy source. For
example, since 2005 the federal government has mandated that gasoline contain ethanol, which is primarily derived from corn. 243 Ethanol
accounted for 10 percent of the volume of gasoline consumed in the
United States in 2011. 244 Moreover, in 2012, roughly 8.6 percent of
all the harvested acreage in the United States was used
directly for ethanol production, 245 which is up from 7 percent in
241. BOSSELMAN ET AL., supra note 158, at 279.
242. Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust, 268 S.W.3d 1, 11-17 (Tex. 2008)
(holding that a fracking operation that crossed property lines two miles below the surface,
injected materials under the neighbors lands, and withdrew gas from under the neighbor’s
land created no actionable trespass absent injury to the surface of the land).
243. See, e.g., Nearly Half of Corn Devoted to Fuel Production Despite Historic Drought,
HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 18, 2012, 12:51 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/08/17/
ethanol-mandate_n_1799046.html.
244. Frequently Asked Questions: How Much Ethanol Is in Gasoline and How Does It
Affect Fuel Economy?, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., http://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/
faq.cfm?id=27&t=10 (last updated Apr. 12, 2013).
245. According to the National Corn Growers Association, in 2012, 30.8 percent of
corn grown in the United States was used for ethanol production. See NAT’L CORN
GROWERS ASS’N, WORLD OF CORN: UNLIMITED POSSIBILITIES 11 (2013), available at
http://www.ncga.com/upload/files/documents/pdf/WOC%202013.pdf. Since corn comprised
roughly 87.4 million of the 310.6 million crop acres harvested in the United States that
year, this means corn accounted for roughly 28 percent of all United States crop acres harvested that year. See id. at 4. Thus, if we assume that 30.8 percent of that 28 percent of
acreage was used for ethanol production (i.e., if acreage is proportional to the amount of
corn produced and used in ethanol production), then that shows 8.6 percent of acreage was
used for ethanol production. Expressed mathematically: 30.8% (corn used for ethanol) x
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2011. 246 Thus farm production has a substantial impact on energy
production, and due to the vast area of farmland harvested for ethanol production—almost 23 million acres in 2011 247 and 26.3 million
acres in 2012 248—many property disputes over farmland are also necessarily disputes over energy-producing land. 249
When farm production, and its attendant smells, dust, and noise,
has come into conflict with property expectations regarding the right
to use and enjoy, state “right-to-farm” statutes have limited or even
eliminated landowners’ abilities to bring nuisance challenges against
farms. 250 Every state has a statute limiting nuisance suits against
farms, but the limitations vary. 251 Milder approaches essentially
create a statute of limitations for challenging objectionable activity 252
or codify the common law “coming to the nuisance” doctrine that
prevents landowners from moving next to a preexisting activity and
then challenging it as a nuisance. 253 Slightly more expansive statutes
foreclose nuisance challenges against certain “qualifying management practices” 254 or against expansion and increased production. 255
Finally, some states have offered blanket nuisance immunity for
farming operations. 256
28% (acreage of land used for corn) = 8.6% (acreage of land used for corn that was ultimately used in ethanol).
246. According to the National Corn Growers Association, in 2011, 27.3 percent of corn
grown in the United States was used for ethanol production, and corn comprised 28.5 percent of all United States crop acres harvested that year. See NAT’L CORN GROWERS ASS’N,
CORN: ROOTED IN HUMAN HISTORY 4-5, 7 (2012), available at http://www.ncga.com/uploads/
useruploads/woc_2012.pdf. Thus, if we assume that 27.3 percent of that 28.5 percent of
acreage was used for ethanol production (i.e., if acreage is proportional to the amount of
corn produced and used in ethanol production), then that shows 7 percent of acreage was
used for ethanol production. Expressed mathematically: 27.3% (corn used for ethanol) x
28.5% (acreage of land used for corn) = 7.7% (acreage of land used for corn that was ultimately used in ethanol).
247. See NAT’L CORN GROWERS ASS’N, supra note 246, at 5, 7. This 23 million figure is
based on the following calculation (which assumes a proportional yield of corn per acreage):
83.9 million (total acres of corn harvested) x 27.3% (corn used for fuel ethanol) = 22.9 million (acres of corn to be used for ethanol).
248. See NAT’L CORN GROWERS ASS’N, supra note 245, at 4, 12. This 26.3 million figure
is based on the following calculation (which assumes a proportional yield of corn per acreage): 87.3 million (total acres of corn harvested) x 30.2% (corn used for fuel ethanol) = 26.3
million (acres of corn to be used for ethanol).
249. More conceptually, farm production in the form of food is an essential energy
source for humans.
250. Terence J. Centner, Governments and Unconstitutional Takings: When Do Rightto-Farm Laws Go Too Far?, 33 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 87, 142 (2006).
251. Id. at 87, 94-95.
252. Id. at 98.
253. Id. at 95.
254. Id. at 107.
255. Id. at 102-04.
256. Id. at 114 (describing this approach as “extremely favorable dispensation to agriculture”).
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Since the inquiry into nuisance has always turned on principles of
reasonableness, 257 these milder limitations that effectively define
reasonable behavior do not create a great shift in property rights.
However, measures insulating farms from nuisance actions effectively create a no-liability rule by removing property owners’ expectation
of seeking possible property-rule or liability-rule protection.
In addition, right-to-farm statutes have also consistently withstood takings challenges. 258 Of the fifty states’ right-to-farm statutes,
only Iowa’s, which took the extreme approach of granting expansive
immunity for animal feeding operations, 259 has been found to create a
compensable taking. 260 Further, commentators have roundly criticized the Iowa decision for applying the incorrect legal standard, 261
suggesting that had the court applied the appropriate standard
it would have found no taking 262 and that the decision should not
be followed. 263
Therefore, while right-to-farm statutes may not be the quintessential example of energy-development policies, they do encourage energy production and demonstrate a similar energy/property balance.
257. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 822(a) (1979).
258. Centner, supra note 250, at 138 (“Under state laws that employ the traditional
right-to-farm doctrine, plaintiffs will not be able to mount successful takings challenges.
The coming to the nuisance doctrine is a permissible extension of state law.” (footnote
omitted)); id. at 139 (“Right-to-farm laws that provide statutes of limitation have been
challenged and have withstood scrutiny.”); id. (“Right-to-farm laws that extend their protection to minor adjustments of activities should withstand scrutiny.”).
259. Id. at 140.
260. See id. at 125 (observing that invasions of personal interests in land do not constitute a physical invasion so they are not per se takings); Jeffry R. Gittins, Comment, Bormann Revisited: Using the Penn Central Test to Determine the Constitutionality of Right-toFarm Statutes, 2006 BYU L. REV. 1381, 1396 (noting that Iowa’s Bormann decision has not
been accepted by courts outside of Iowa); Jason Jordan, Comment, A Pig in the Parlor or
Food on the Table: Is Texas’s Right to Farm Act an Unconstitutional Mechanism to Perpetuate Nuisances or Sound Public Policy Ensuring Sustainable Growth?, 42 TEX. TECH. L.
REV. 943, 960-62, 972-77 (2010) (summarizing Oregon, California, Idaho, and Indiana cases upholding the constitutionality of right-to-farm laws and evaluating a Texas antinuisance law to conclude that it does not result in a unconstitutional physical taking).
261. See Adam Van Buskirk, Right-to-Farm Laws as “Takings” in Light of Bormann v.
Board of Supervisors and Moon v. North Idaho Farmers Association, 11 ALB. L. ENVTL.
OUTLOOK J. 169, 192-96 (2006) (arguing that the Penn Central balancing test is the appropriate test for evaluating whether right-to-farm statutes constitute takings); Centner, supra note 250, at 119-20; Gittins, supra note 260, at 1407-10 (arguing for the Penn Central
test for evaluating right to farm statutes).
262. Jennifer L. Beidel, Pennsylvania’s Right-to-Farm Law: A Relief for Farmers or an
Unconstitutional Taking?, 110 PENN ST. L. REV. 163, 176-84 (2005) (arguing that the Penn
Central test is the appropriate standard and that under that test the Iowa statutes would
not have been takings); Gittins, supra note 260, at 1382 (arguing that most right-to-farm
statutes will not be found to be takings under the Penn Central balancing test).
263. Centner, supra note 250, at 137-38 (“Federal regulatory takings jurisprudence
suggests it is doubtful that other courts will follow the Iowa decisions to find that a rightto-farm law effects a taking.”); see also supra notes 259-60 and accompanying text.
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E. Conclusion
As detailed above, legislatures and courts have consistently
shaped property expectations to accommodate energy production and
development. The overarching justification for striking this energy/property balance has been that at the margins the broad social
importance of energy production outweighs individual property protections. Thus courts and legislatures have altered property expectations, frequently by instituting no-liability rules or by shifting remedies from property rules to liability rules, to encourage the development of burgeoning energy resources, to increase the efficiency of
production, and to overcome coordination failures or holdout problems. 264 This energy/property balance has informed property expectations since colonial reliance on firewood and water, and it continues
to play a role in supporting modern energy sources from fracking to
ethanol and beyond.
V. APPLYING THE ENERGY/PROPERTY BALANCE
TO AGGRESSIVE RENEWABLE ENERGY POLICIES
This Part examines how the energy/property balance applies to
the modern energy context, particularly in terms of current energyversus-property conflicts presented by aggressive efforts to promote
distributed generation and microgrid development. First, this Part
discusses how the energy/property balance informs a property owner’s reasonable expectations when the right to exclude and the right
to use and enjoy are pitted against energy production. Next, it highlights the normative justifications for applying the energy/property
balance to renewable energy projects. Finally, it considers how the
energy/property balance informs takings claims regarding aggressive
renewable energy policies, ultimately concluding that takings concerns offer no impediment to these policies.
A. Reasonable Expectations
While mere historical practice alone may not be sufficient to justify the continuation of legal regimes, 265 much of our law is based on
synthesized patterns of historical operation and expectation. This is
particularly true of property law, which is centered upon expectations 266 drawn from “background principles,” “existing rules [and]
264. In a follow-up piece, I plan to offer a full discussion of how the energy/property
balance fits into modern property theory in its approach to addressing these concerns.
265. See, e.g., OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, The Path Of The Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL
PAPERS 167, 187 (1920) (“It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that
so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV.”).
266. See, e.g., Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577,
577 (1988) (“[A]s Jeremy Bentham said long ago, property is ‘nothing but a basis of expec-
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understandings,” past practices, common-law precedents, and past
actions of state legislatures to form and shape property rights. 267
These expectations form the basis of the right to exclude or the right
to use and enjoy, and they indicate whether owners can count on
property-rule, liability-rule, or no-liability-rule remedies for infringement on these rights. It is little wonder that doctrines focus on
“investment-backed expectations” 268 and “background principles” 269 to
determine whether government action constitutes a compensable
taking of property rights.
In this light, the previous Part’s review of the energy/property
balance shows more than just a historical pattern. Rather, it shows
how legislatures and courts have consistently shaped rules and understandings of property to create an expectation that property rights
are less robust and less compensable when they conflict with energy
development. In fact, with its roots tracing back to colonial times and
beyond, the energy/property balance has sufficient historical pedigree
to qualify as one of the background principles of property. 270 At the
very least, the energy/property balance informs a property owner’s
reasonable expectations regarding the remedies she might have
regarding renewable energy projects. Thus just as the energy/property
balance indicates that a property owner’s expectations are diminished in the face of traditional energy sources such as oil and gas or
coal extraction, so a property owner’s expectations are also limited in
the face of renewable energy development. This diminished expectation indicates that the right to exclude or the right to use and enjoy
may be subject to no-liability remedies if infringed by renewable
energy projects.

tation.’ ” (quoting J. BENTHAM, THEORY OF LEGISLATION, PRINCIPLES OF THE CIVIL CODE
pt. 1, ch. 8, at 68 (Baxi ed., Hildreth trans., 1975) (1802))).
267. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 (1992) (discussing common law
background principles as the basis for property rights and expectations); see also id.
at 1030 (noting that “ ‘existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent
source such as state law’ . . . define the range of interests that qualify for protection as
‘property’ ”).
268. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 127 (1978).
269. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029.
270. In Lucas, the Court described the background principle thusly: “Any limitation so
severe cannot be newly legislated or decreed (without compensation), but must inhere in
the title itself, in the restrictions that background principles of the State’s law of property
and nuisance already place upon land ownership. A law or decree with such an effect must,
in other words, do no more than duplicate the result that could have been achieved in the
courts—by adjacent landowners (or other uniquely affected persons).” Id.
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B. Normative Justifications
As Justice Holmes famously observed:
It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that
so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the grounds upon which it was laid down have vanished
long since, and the rule simply persists from blind imitation of
the past. 271

However, far from being a blind imitation of the past, application
of the energy/property balance to emerging renewable energy projects
has strong normative justifications. For example, renewable energy
projects face the same challenges and concerns that animated the
energy/property balance in the case of firewood, water, coal, hydropower, oil and gas, and farm production. Specifically, distributed
generation and microgrid projects occasion the same location-specific
siting challenges, coordination and holdout problems, establishment
hurdles, and efficiency justifications that were common to past energy developments. Thus the energy doctrines discussed above remain
strong and relevant comparators to the renewable energy context.
Moreover, the exigencies of climate change and historic subsidies for
fossil fuel energy sources make an even more compelling case that
renewable energy projects deserve the advantages that property law
has afforded to other energy sources.
First, renewable energy shares the same location-specific concerns
that traditional energy sources relied on the energy/property balance
to address. Frequently, access to specific locations is a limiting factor
in the efficient extraction or production of energy resources, and the
energy/property balance reached was necessary to facilitate such access. For example, oil and gas or coal deposits are only located beneath certain tracts, and forced pooling and unitization as well as
private eminent domain measures provided access to exploit these
location-specific resources. Similarly, dams used for waterpower or
hydroelectricity flooded tracts located nearby. Since neither the
tracts nor bodies of water could be moved, it was necessary to resolve
these location conflicts; the mill acts and eminent domain exercises
provided a means of doing so quickly. Even doctrines related to the
gathering of firewood addressed location-specific concerns. Though
trees were abundant across the landscape, the difficulty of transporting wood over great distances meant that meaningful access to firewood had to be proximate to its ultimate place of use. Hence the fire
bote and access to a neighbor’s land provided convenient locations for
gathering wood at relatively low effort and cost. Similar concerns animated oil and gas pipeline regulations; the location of fields and
271. HOLMES, supra note 265, at 187.
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pipelines meant that often only a single pipeline provided a means of
transporting oil and gas from the field, so the law required the pipeline to take from all the wells on the pipeline.
These same location-specific concerns are present in distributed
generation and microgrid projects as well as in measures to site renewable energy on advantageous parcels. Many of the benefits of distributed generation and microgrids are premised on their location;
the close proximity of energy production to its place of use allows
these projects to avoid transmission losses and energy sprawl. Similarly, efforts to site renewable energy facilities on particularly advantageous parcels, such as ideal wind or solar corridors, rely fundamentally on access to specific locations. 272 Just as with many of our traditional energy resources, location can be key to the efficient and effective production of renewable energy.
Renewable energy projects also encounter the same coordination
failures and holdout problems that the energy/property balance
helped traditional energy production overcome. Oil and gas development suffered from coordination problems that hampered beneficial
development. 273 For example, despite the economically advantageous
and efficient results of pooling and unitization, parties rarely joined
together voluntarily. Forced pooling and unitization responded to this
coordination failure by mandating cooperation. By the same token,
when property owners surrounding bodies of water failed to coordinate and develop waterpower or hydroelectric projects through private market agreements, the mill acts and eminent domain condemnations overcame this failure to deal and allowed projects to go forward. Relatedly, strategic holdouts and NIMBY 274 objections would
have forestalled energy development if not for energy/property balance interventions. For example, pipeline regulations prevent pipeline owners from strategically refusing to buy and carry oil and gas
from certain producers, and right-to-farm statutes prevent NIMBY
objections to farming operations.
Reminiscent of unitization, microgrid development also lags due to
coordination problems. As discussed above, despite the advantages of
microgrid systems, few have developed voluntarily, and cognitive
barriers or market irrationality prevent coordination in these efforts.
Similarly, renewables projects may face strategic holdout or NIMBY
opposition. For instance, “[s]trategic behavior, endowment effects,
272. See, e.g., Rule, supra note 91.
273. See KRAMER & MARTIN, supra note 62, § 1.02 (“The history of oil and gas development in the United States leads to the inevitable conclusion that the legal, economic, and
engineering worlds have never reached a level of coordination that would allow for the
efficient and equitable development of oil and gas reservoirs without substantial governmental intervention.” (emphasis added)).
274. “Not in my backyard.”
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asymmetric information, or other factors could potentially undermine
adjacent landowners’ ability to consistently negotiate arrangements
that allocate scarce wind resources to their highest valued user,” 275
and efforts to allocate wind or solar rights 276 are an attempted response to some of these coordination problems.
In addition to overcoming coordination and holdout problems, the
energy/property balance fostered energy sources in their infancy, aiding new technologies or resources in overcoming establishment hurdles. For example, the mill acts helped waterpower gain a foothold as
a major energy source of the time, and both the doctrine of capture
and conservation measures helped spur the rise of oil and gas. The
energy/property balance nurtured oil and gas, hydropower, and coal
development, and now it is necessary to support burgeoning distributed generation and microgrid projects.
Finally, the efficiency and reciprocity of advantage reasoning that
justified the energy/property balance for traditional energy sources
applies with equal force to renewable energy. The collective social
benefits of greater energy production at lower costs justified diminishing property expectations to promote efficient energy development. Therefore, while oil could still be produced without forced pooling and unitization or pipeline regulations, while coal could still be
mined without updated techniques and private imminent domain,
while waterpower and hydroelectricity could have developed without
mill acts and eminent domain, and while farming could still occur
without nuisance protection, in the absence of these regimes all
would have proceeded more slowly, more expensively, and less efficiently. Legislatures and courts determined that the social benefits of
quicker, cheaper, and more efficient energy development were shared
by all of the property owners who suffered diminished property expectations, and this reciprocity of advantage helped justify application of the energy/property balance.
Renewable energy too offers major, long-term reciprocity of advantage that will only increase with quicker, cheaper, and more efficient development. In fact, the advantages of renewable energy
surpass those of traditional energy sources because renewables offer
the additional benefits of domestic energy supplies, reduced greenhouse gas emissions, lower transmission costs and losses, and reduced energy sprawl.
Moreover, the combination of climate change realities and historic
subsidies for fossil fuel sources offers even more compelling justifications for applying the energy/property balance to renewables. Currently, greenhouse gas pollution from energy production is accelerat275. Rule, supra note 91, at 218.
276. See, e.g., id.
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ing climate change and its major impacts on human and environmental health. 277 In response, numerous scientific, policy, and advocacy
organizations have called for a major and immediate greenhouse gas
reduction. For example, the National Academy of Sciences (“NAS”)
has concluded that the United States “needs to get started now in
aggressively pursuing available emission reduction opportunities”
and has suggested that this will “require a major departure from
‘business as usual’ in how we produce and use energy.” 278 NAS has
thus concluded that “essentially all available options for reducing
greenhouse gas emissions (e.g., for energy efficiency, for low-carbon
electricity production, for low-carbon fuels) will need to be deployed at
levels near the maximum extent of what . . . is technically possible”
and that a key policy strategy is “promoting widespread implementation of existing technologies for energy efficiency and low-carbon energy sources (such as renewables).” 279 These suggestions highlight
the importance of aggressive efforts to promote renewables and the
necessity of applying the energy/property balance in support of these
efforts. Climate change considerations also underscore the
“goose/gander” argument that if the energy/property balance favored
energy sources that contributed to climate change, then it should also
favor renewable sources that help reduce the extent of climate
change. Put another way, since the energy/property balance has contributed to the problem, it should also be part of the solution.
In that vein, applying the energy/property balance to promote
renewable energy is also necessary to remove market distortions
and give renewables a chance of competing with traditional fossil
fuel sources. A history of favoritism has distorted the market to favor
fossil-fuel-based energy. Fossil fuel sources not only enjoy the advantage of entrenchment in United States infrastructure, economy,
and law, but they also continue to benefit from a long history of preferential treatment, including both direct monetary subsidies 280 and
277. The Hard Facts of Global Warming, SIERRA CLUB, http://action.sierraclub.org/site/
PageServer?pagename=NH_GW_Facts (last visited Mar. 4, 2014) (“[O]ur emission of
greenhouse gas pollution is causing global warming to occur at a much faster rate than
ever before. The world’s leading climate scientists project that during our children’s lifetimes, global warming will raise the average temperature of the planet by 3 to 10 degrees
Fahrenheit – a shift that will rival the change in temperature since the last ice age. Unless
we slow, and ultimately reverse, the buildup of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, we
will have decades – not millennia – to deal with radical changes in weather patterns, sea
levels and threats to human health.”).
278. Div. on Earth & Life Studies, supra note 90.
279. Id. (emphasis added).
280. Due to entrenched favoritism of fossil fuel sources in the United States, even a
policy that treats all energy sources equally will systematically favor fossil fuel sources.
See, e.g., Amy Wilson Morris & Jessica Owley, Mitigating the Impacts of the Renewable
Energy Gold Rush, 15 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 293, 301 (2014) (noting that the
“entrenched, subsidy-receiving fossil fuel industry” stands as a limiting factor for solar
development).
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implicit subsidies, such as the no-liability rules established by the
energy/property balance. Among fossil fuels, natural gas enjoys a
particular position of advantage at the moment. Gas is currently
cheap due in part to both loosely regulated fracking 281 and the benefits of the energy/property balance. 282 Absent significant efforts to
promote renewable energy, gas is likely to come to dominate electrical energy production, causing retrenchment of fossil-fuel-based energy production and thereby exacerbating climate change impacts. 283
To begin leveling the playing field with natural gas requires at least
that renewable energy benefit from the same energy/property balance that gas enjoys.
C. Takings
The major concern expressed regarding the furthest-reaching aggressive renewable energy policies is that they would constitute takings. However, under the energy/property balance, which frequently
imposed a no-liability rule for similar infringements on property expectations, such actions would not be compensable takings. As has
been the pattern with energy development in the past, policymakers
can pursue these aggressive measures to encourage renewable energy production without fear that courts will find them to be takings.
As noted earlier, aggressive renewable energy policies such as
mandates or limitations on neighbors’ rights create tension with ordinary property expectations and occasion concern about takings
claims. 284 However, the energy/property balance diffuses this tension
by reforming these expectations when they run up against energy
production, and this shift in expectation diminishes takings concerns.
Importantly, these shifted property expectations do not change the
takings inquiry employed by the courts, but they inform its application and, unsurprisingly, make it less likely that energy projects will
constitute takings. Thus the energy/property balance influences both
regulatory takings and physical takings analyses.
First, the energy/property balance may inform the Penn Central
balancing test for regulatory takings in two ways. It may create a
background principle that forecloses takings liability for energy de281. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Four Questions About Fracking, 63 CASE W. RES.
L. REV. 971, 977-980 (2013) (discussing fracking, cheap natural gas, and the need for
regulation).
282. As noted above, courts have applied a no-liability rule when fracking operations
have invaded otherwise protected property rights, and this freedom from liability can act
as a form of subsidy, reducing the cost of natural gas development. See Coastal Oil & Gas
Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust, 268 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2008); see also supra notes 241-42 and
accompanying text.
283. Merrill, supra note 281, at 992 (“Cheap gas . . . is poison for renewables”).
284. See discussion supra Part IV.
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velopment, or, even if it is not a background principle, the energy/property balance informs the balancing test such that it will be
difficult to show a taking absent an enormous economic deprivation.
As noted above, the history underlying the energy/property balance is sufficiently long and consistent enough that it may be considered a background principle of property. Background principles of
property law inhere with property title and limit property rights;
laws that simply restate or recreate those background principles
have not altered, and thus cannot have taken, any existing property
right. 285 Accordingly, if a property owner has no expectation of a remedy when energy development projects infringe on otherwise protected property rights, then he has no expectation to be free of energy
development activities and has no property right that can be taken
by laws promoting energy development. 286 If there is no property expectation infringed, then the Penn Central balancing test becomes
unnecessary because there cannot be a regulatory taking without an
underlying property right to take.
Alternatively, even if the energy/property balance is not a background principle, it at least influences the Penn Central balancing
inquiry, particularly in terms of the investment-backed expectation
and character of government action. A property owner has little investment-backed expectation to be free from energy development. As
extensively discussed, the energy/property balance shapes property
owners’ expectations such that they should not expect a remedy for
energy development that infringes on otherwise protected rights to exclude or use and enjoy. Given the long history of the energy/property
balance, a property owner can be considered aware of these diminished expectations and reasonably anticipate them; the expectation
prong therefore cuts against finding a taking. 287 Further, the energy/property balance impacts the character of the government action
prong because the promotion of energy development advances an
important public interest and creates a great reciprocity of ad285. As the Supreme Court has stated, “We held in Lucas that the government must
pay just compensation for such ‘total regulatory takings,’ except to the extent that ‘background principles of nuisance and property law’ independently restrict the owner’s intended use of the property.” Lingle v. Chevron, 544 U.S. 528, 538 (2005) (quoting Lucas v. S.C.
Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1026-1032 (1992)).
286. See Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 560 U.S. 702
(2010) (holding that under established background principles of property law, a beach restoration project did not constitute a taking of property rights).
287. See Echeverria, supra note 130, at 184 (discussing the relevant inquiry for reasonable investment-backed expectation to include “(1) whether the plaintiff operated in a
‘highly regulated industry;’ (2) whether the plaintiff was aware of the problem that
spawned the regulation at the time it purchased the property; and (3) whether the plaintiff
could have ‘reasonably anticipated’ the possibility of such regulation in light of the ‘regulatory environment’ at the time of purchase” (quoting Apollo Fuels, Inc. v. United States, 381
F.3d 1338, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2004))).
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vantage. 288 As a result, this prong also counsels against takings liability. Unless an energy production measure arises to a per se taking
by eliminating all of a property’s value, 289 the energy/property balance virtually ensures that it will not be considered a taking under
the Penn Central test.
Second, the energy/property balance informs the per se physical
takings rule by adding nuance to the otherwise formalistic framework. Specifically, the energy/property balance shifts the expected
remedy for a physical invasion from a strict-liability rule to a
no-liability rule or possibly a liability rule subject to a balancing
test, depending on the impact to the property. For example, with
physical intrusions that did not completely foreclose other uses of the
property, no-liability rules were the norm, as demonstrated by doctrines regarding firewood gathering, coal mining, forced pooling,
forced unitization, pipeline regulation, and subsurface drilling.
When, however, a physical invasion foreclosed other property uses, as
in the case of flooding under the mill acts, a landowner was compensated unless she benefitted on the whole. In this case, protection for
the right to exclude was reduced from a strict-liability rule to a liability-rule with a balancing component akin to the Penn Central test.
The only instance of per se compensation, a strict-liability rule,
was in the eminent domain context, such as for coal or hydropower,
where full title to property actually transferred. 290 Under the energy/property balance the remedy for physical invasions seems to turn
on the quality of the invasion, reflecting a shift from a formalist to a
functionalist inquiry due to the diminished right to exclude energy
production activities.
Applying these takings tests as informed by the energy/property
balance to aggressive renewable energy policies shows that the policies do not constitute compensable takings. First and most simply,
existing policies—such as New Jersey’s law that a builder must offer
the option of solar energy, California’s “solar ready” rooftop requirement, mandatory solar hot water heaters in Hawaii and Puerto Rico,
or measures to implement California’s “Zero Net Energy” policy—
288. See id. at 186-210 (discussing the meaning of the character of the government
action prong to include “reciprocity of advantage” and “public interest”); see also Hanoch
Dagan, Just Compensation, Incentives, and Social Meanings, 99 MICH. L. REV. 134, 136
(2000) (“A takings doctrine attuned to the virtues of social responsibility and equality . . .
should start with a rule of long-term reciprocity of advantage . . . .”).
289. See Lucas, 505 U.S. 1003; see also Echeverria, supra note 130, at 186 (noting that
most takings challenges do not succeed unless a regulation eliminates nearly all of a property’s value). Moreover, as discussed earlier, if the energy/property balance is considered a
background principle, then an energy production measure will not constitute a taking even
if it eliminates all of a property’s value. See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 538.
290. Under the mill acts, there was no transfer of title to the flooded lands. Cf.
HORWITZ, supra note 166, at 47.

486

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41:435

have little to fear from takings claims. None reduces all the economic
value of a property nor causes a physical invasion that curtails all
other uses.
Second, more aggressive policy proposals should survive takings
challenges for largely the same reasons. For example, laws creating
solar rights or wind rights that foreclose certain land uses 291 or a policies absolving solar and wind projects from nuisance suits 292 face only the Penn Central balancing test because they involve no thirdparty physical invasion. Factoring in the energy/property balance, as
long as these measures do not reduce all the economic value of the
property, they do not create takings. Further, mandatory microgrid
installation or mandatory energy development on promising parcels,
even if they involved compulsory installation of third-party equipment or compulsory third-party access, should not create a taking.
These measures would not reduce all economic value of the parcel.
Additionally, as long as the third-party physical invasions did not
prevent all other use of the property or transfer title outright via eminent domain, a no-liability rule should foreclose takings claims.
As a result, state and local governments should not allow takings
concerns to stand in the way of implementing these and other aggressive renewable energy policies. 293 The energy/property balance
shows that as new energy sources have emerged, the law has shaped
property rights to accommodate them; after all, “[t]he police power
embodies the community’s ability to regulate and alter the scope of
entitlements over time as their social meaning changes. This power
to change the scope of property rights is necessary to preserve their
social function.” 294
VI. CONCLUSION
When legislatures and courts have weighed energy versus property, energy has gotten a thumb on the scale. Throughout our legal history, courts have accommodated the societal interests in promoting
energy production even when that meant reshaping fundamental
private property expectations in the right to exclude, the right to use
291. See, e.g., Rule, supra note 91, at 242.
292. See Walker, supra note 54.
293. The energy/property balance is, of course, bounded by political checks; a government must first enact a policy mandating energy development or limiting neighbors’ rights
for the energy/property balance to impact a takings claim. Further, abuse of the energy/property balance in other non-renewable energy contexts, such as to promote hydraulic
fracturing, is not a concern because the law already allows similar practice in those contexts. See, e.g., Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust, 268 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2008).
Existing energy sources already benefit from the energy/property balance and from the noliability rules it imposes.
294. Singer & Beermann, supra note 131, at 228.
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and enjoy, and the remedies available for those rights. Now that renewable energy projects face the same hurdles that past energy developments did, the energy/property balance should tip the same way.
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